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CLASS CONFLICTS
Morris A. Ratner*
Abstract: The approach of the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor provides the opportunity to reflect on the
collapse of the framework it announced for managing intra-class conflicts. That framework,
reinforced two years later in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., was bold, in that it broadly defined
actionable conflicts to include divergent interests with regard to settlement allocation;
market-based, in that it sought to regulate such conflicts by harnessing competing subclass
counsel’s financial incentives; and committed to intrinsic process values, insofar as, to assure
structural fairness, the Court was willing to upend a settlement that would have solved the
asbestos litigation crisis. Since the 1990s, the lower federal courts have chipped away at the
foundation of that conflicts management regime by limiting Amchem and Ortiz to their facts,
narrowly defining the kinds of conflicts that warrant subclassing, and turning to alternative
assurances of fairness that do not involve fostering competition among subclass counsel. A
new model of managing class conflicts is emerging from the trenches of federal trial courts.
It is modest, insofar as it has a high tolerance for allocation conflicts; regulatory, rather than
market or incentive-based, in that it relies on judicial officers to police conflicts; and
utilitarian, because settlement outcomes provide convincing evidence of structurally fair
procedures. In short, the new model is fundamentally the mirror image of the conflicts
management framework the Court created at end of the last century. This Article provides an
institutional account of this transformation, examining how changes in the way mass tort and
other large-scale wrongs are litigated make it inconvenient to adhere to the Supreme Court’s
twentieth century conflicts management blueprint. There is a lesson here: a jurisprudential
edifice built without regard to the practical realities of resolving large-scale litigation cannot
stand.
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INTRODUCTION
At the close of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court overturned
two of the largest mass tort1 settlements in U.S. history on the ground
that intra-class conflicts of interest rendered representation inadequate.
The trial courts in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor2 and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.3 had approved class action settlements of asbestos
claims where in each case the members of the settlement class had
divergent interests with regard to settlement design and specifically with
regard to allocation of settlement amounts among class members.
The Court held that such conflicts could not be overcome merely by
showing that a settlement was good, or, in the uninspiring language of
Rule 23, “adequate.”4 Instead, adequate representation had to be baked
into the organization of plaintiffs and class counsel to justify non-party
preclusion of absent class members.5 In Amchem and Ortiz, that meant
that the settlement classes had to be divided into subclasses, each with
their own representative plaintiffs and, importantly, their own lawyers
whose attorneys’ fees depended on the subclass members’ fortunes and
who could thus be trusted to loyally advance their interests when

1. As used herein, the term “mass tort” refers broadly to mass production injuries. See MANUAL
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.1 at 343 (2004) [hereinafter MANUAL] (mass tort
litigation “emerges when an event or series of related events injure a large number of people or
damage their property” (internal quotation omitted)); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions:
What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 393, 393 n.1 (2000) (defining mass
torts “as encompassing any (negligently or strictly) tortious systematic risk-taking by business that
exposes some population of individuals to injury in person or property or both”). Because they often
involve claims of varying strength, including differences in type of injury, proof of causation, and
applicable law, mass tort class actions raise particularly vexing conflicts of interest problems. See
generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 5354 (1995).
2. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
3. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
5. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 591; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815.
FOR
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negotiating settlement terms.6 Failure to do so rendered class
certification illegitimate and justified overturning the class settlements in
those cases, leaving the federal trial courts saddled with the asbestos
litigation crisis without any viable tools for resolving it outside of
bankruptcy proceedings.7
Though the Supreme Court has not squarely returned to the conflicts
management questions it answered in Amchem and Ortiz, the lower
federal courts have spent the better part of the past two decades chipping
away at their foundations, limiting them to their facts, assuming away
and narrowly defining the kinds of conflicts of interest that warrant
subclassing, and turning to alternative structural assurances of fairness
that do not involve fostering competition among class counsel.8 In their
place, lower federal courts have erected a mirror image of the Amchem
conflicts management regime, one that is modest in ambition, prefers
regulatory to market approaches to managing conflicts, and privileges
utilitarianism over the intrinsic value of procedural fairness.9
From the beginning, Amchem and Ortiz generated critical academic
commentary.10 Courts have largely sought to distinguish or reinterpret
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) states that “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses
that are each treated as a class under this rule.” See generally ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.23 at 337 (2016) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MANUAL] (“Subclasses must
be created when differences in the positions of class members require separate representatives and
separate counsel.”); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:58 at 346–47
(5th ed. 2011) (“Conflicts of interest between the class representative and some members of the
class often may be resolved through the creation of subclasses.”); Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2351 (2006) (reviewing subclasses and theories of their proper role).
7. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and
Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1906–10 (2002) (describing asbestos litigation filings post-Amchem
and Ortiz); Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1931 (2002) (noting that for many defendants
bankruptcy became the only logical response after Amchem and Ortiz).
8. See infra section II.C.
9. For a typology of market, regulatory, and other approaches to managing class actions, see
generally William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches,
53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1453–67 (2006). For purposes of this Article, the terms “procedural
fairness” and “structural fairness” are used interchangeably, though the former is arguably broader
than the latter.
10. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT.
REV. 337, 351 (1999) (criticizing the “retreat to rules formalism” in Amchem and Ortiz); Richard A.
Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 330 (2003)
(“Interest alignment within the class certainly should remain a part of due process analysis. But it is
only a part, and not the most important one at that . . . . [T]he law might better ground the
legitimacy of class representation in the structural constraints that operate upon representatives in
governing arrangements where consent is already attenuated—the administrative state being the
prime example.”); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel
in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (1998) (“We first criticize the
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them rather than undertake a direct attack.11 We are thus left to read
between the lines of the lower courts’ decisions both to notice and to do
a forensic analysis of Amchem’s death by a thousand cuts. This Article
takes up that challenge, providing an institutional account by looking at
the ways in which a profound transformation over the past two decades
in the arrangements for managing mass torts via the multi-district
litigation model (“MDL model”)12 has boosted federal courts’
confidence in their ability to directly regulate conflicts, while making
subclassing with separate counsel especially inconvenient. In so doing,
the Article ties together three strands in the class action and mass tort
literature: commentary prematurely13 proclaiming the death of class
actions and the emergence of the new MDL model for managing mass
tort and other complex litigation;14 a rich and burgeoning literature
unreality of the Amchem Court’s ‘no trade-offs’ approach that would apparently preclude counsel
from making any settlement allocation decisions, or handling other conflicts, in the class action
context.”).
11. See infra section II.C.
12. This new model is described more fully in Part III infra. See generally Edward F. Sherman,
The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2205 (2008); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method for
Managing Multi-District Litigation: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 110 (2010)
(“The four practices just described–judicial appointment of lead attorneys, judicial control of lead
attorneys’ compensation, forced fee transfer, and fee cuts–jointly constitute the emerging ‘quasi
class action’ approach to MDL management.”); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From
Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 58 KAN.
L. REV. 775 (2010).
13. See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American
Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 404 (2014) (“[N]otwithstanding the advent of nonclass aggregate
litigation, Rule 23 class litigation remains a vital feature of the litigation landscape.”). But see
Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1600 (2016)
(“A few courts have been willing to certify personal injury class actions for settlement purposes.
Examples include the National Football League concussion litigation and the Deepwater Horizon
case. For the most part, however, personal injury mass torts continue to be adjudicated outside of
the class action arena. I believe that this trend will continue in the next decade.”).
14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 88 (2011) (“The mass-tort class action as we know it is virtually
extinct.”); Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We’ll Settle in Bunches:
Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1778 (1997) (“[I]t is
apparent that few, if any, mass tort classes (especially those involving exposure-only victims), could
meet the majority’s interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance test or Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy
of representation test. . . .”); Noah Smith-Drelich, Curing the Mass Tort Settlement Malaise, 48
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (“[C]lass actions are no longer viable in the mass tort context . . . .”).
See also Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295,
309 (1996) (“In short, although the prospect of Supreme Court review does raise some hope for
clarification, recent decisions cast doubt upon the suggestion that Rule 23, in its current form, will
enable the legal system either to afford justice in a timely manner between plaintiffs and defendants
or to ease the burden upon the courts of doing so.”).
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regarding “new” mass tort conflicts that arise in the MDL setting;15 and
the traditional class action conflicts literature.16 The link among these
literatures is the vital but underappreciated role that class actions still
play in the new MDL model as a form of legal closure.17
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly describes
the regime for identifying and managing class conflicts that the Supreme
Court erected in Amchem and Ortiz. Part II uses recent class settlements
of sprawling mass torts in the BP oil spill and NFL concussion injury
litigations to show how far we have strayed from Amchem and maps the
attack vectors lower courts have pursued toward that end. Part III
describes the new institutional arrangements for managing mass torts
that explain Amchem’s decline and the emergence of a competing and
newly ascendant conflicts management model.18 The purpose of this
15. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
71 (2015) (reviewing conflicts that result from the interplay of repeat players and systemic
pressures); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass
Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157 (2004) (describing collusion in nonclass aggregate settlements); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279 (2011) (reviewing ethical challenges posed by the non-class
settlement of Vioxx litigation); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and
Ethical Implications of Coordinating Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000)
(reviewing ethical challenges created by informal aggregation); Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in
Mass Tort Plaintiffs’ Representation: Beyond the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3233 (2013) (discussing ethical issues in non-class aggregate litigation).
16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1373–84 (1995) (surveying forms of collusion in class actions); Susan P.
Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 129, 145–55 (2001) (surveying forms of class action abuse); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1159, 1179–1212 (1995) (sketching ethics of mass tort settlement with emphasis on class
settlements); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the
Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 583–97 (2003) (inquiring into the proper
standard for dealing with class conflicts); Nancy J. Moore, “Who Should Regulate Class Action
Lawyers?”, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1482–1503 (2003) (surveying ethics issues in class actions,
focusing on conflicts; proposing adoption of an entity theory of the class and use of Rule 23 case
law to evolve regulatory mechanisms mindful of the ethics rules).
17. Legal “closure” or “peace” results from a class judgment because the judgment precludes
continued litigation of claims governed by the class settlement’s release as to all persons who do not
opt out of the settlement class. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class
Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2003) (describing
how designers of class settlements attempt to achieve closure).
18. In adopting an institutional evolutionary vantage point, the Article follows a trail blazed in the
mass tort setting by, among others, Professor Schuck, who used the same lens to explain
developments in an earlier (pre-Amchem) era. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional
Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 944 (1995) (“The evolutionist emphasis draws
attention to, and treats in a more consistent fashion, three distinct but related features of mass torts
litigation: (1) incremental systems-building, (2) common-law process, and (3) selection by judges
and other policymakers among competing institutional designs.”); see also Donald Elliott,
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Article is not to judge this new regime, but to announce and explain its
arrival.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S LATE-TWENTIETH CENTURY
BLUEPRINT FOR MANAGING CLASS CONFLICTS

A.

The Ill-Defined Pre-Amchem Regime

In the 1940 decision Hansberry v. Lee,19 the Supreme Court noted the
“principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is
not designated as a party.”20 The Court recognized an exception, i.e.,
“the judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which some
members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those
represented who were not made parties to it.”21 But, the Court held, the
Due Process Clause requires adequate representation as a condition of
such non-party preclusion.22 In Hansberry, the Illinois state courts had
found a prior state trial court judgment binding not only on the named
plaintiff who had successfully enforced a racially restrictive property
covenant, but also on a class of property owners, some of whom wished
to enforce the covenant and others of whom opposed it.23 In other words,
the class included persons with diametrically opposed interests who
were potentially directly adverse, as evidenced by the fact that the class
judgment was being used and challenged collaterally in a subsequent suit
brought by class members who supported the covenant against those
who did not.24 Under those circumstances, the Court held, representation
was inadequate.
When the modern version of Rule 23 of the federal rules took shape
in 1966, it included a requirement of adequate representation applicable

Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 30607 (1986)
(laying out an evolutionary theory of procedure, tracing it to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and his
precursors).
19. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
20. Id. at 40.
21. Id. at 41.
22. Id. at 42–43 (“It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not present
as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately
represented.”).
23. Id. at 44 (“Because of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of those who are putative
parties to the agreement in compelling or resisting its performance, it is impossible to say, solely
because they are parties to it, that any two of them are of the same class.”).
24. Id. at 4445.
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to all class actions, but did not identify which conflicts less complete or
direct than those at issue in Hansberry were disabling.25 In the ensuing
years, the Court has never fully mapped such lesser conflicts.26
Nevertheless, ethics doctrine provides a helpful analytical framework. 27
Conflicts are inevitable if clients are directly adverse, but can also arise
when the duties a lawyer owes to one person present a significant risk of
material limitation of the lawyer’s representation of another.28 In formal
aggregation, we are especially concerned with a subset of the universe of
potential material limitation conflicts, i.e., those that are structural in that
they threaten to “skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as
to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned
evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally
vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.”29
Intra-class material limitation conflicts that have the possibility of
skewing outcomes are generally of two types—investment and
allocation.30 Investment conflicts typically arise when subgroups of class

25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
26. This is largely the result of the way in which disputes bubble up to the Supreme Court. The
Court is called upon in each instance to determine whether the facts of a specific case render class
counsel impermissibly conflicted, but does not act legislatively to address all possible categories of
conflicts unrelated to the facts at hand. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
625 (1997) (assessing adequacy of representation by reference to the class approved in that case);
see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Supreme Court as Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12
(1978) (“I do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that the Court should make legal
pronouncements in broader categorical terms rather than narrower ones. I only say that the
appropriate breadth of its pronouncements about law is determined neither by considerations of
‘rationality’ nor by the ‘nature’ of the judicial process.”).
27. Ethics law does not supply the rule of decision for purposes of determining whether
subclasses are necessary. See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 6, § 3:58 at 346.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). Comment 25
excludes absent class members from the purview of Rule 1.7(a)(1), regarding direct conflicts, but
does not make such an exclusion for Rule 1.7(a)(2) material limitation conflicts. Id. (“When a
lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit,
unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes
of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule.”).
29. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1)(B) (AM. LAW INST. 2009);
see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1649, 1684 (2008) (conflicts that matter are “those that give rise to a significant potential for
negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to skew in some predictable way the design of
class-settlement terms in favor of one or another subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of the
relevant claims”).
30. Other scholars have offered competing typologies of conflicts in aggregate litigation. See,
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 385–93 (2000) (noting four “structural”
conflicts in mass tort class actions, including allocation, settlement motivations, risk preferences,
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members have inconsistent theories of liability or priorities with regard
to case development. Allocation conflicts typically arise at the time of
settlement, when the funds available to resolve a matter have to be
distributed among persons who have competing claims to it. The fund
from which competing claimants are paid can be limited because the
defendant’s resources are limited; or because the parties have agreed to
resolve a group of claims or issues for an aggregate amount to be
allocated among participating claimants; or because the parties negotiate
multiple claims or issues sequentially or simultaneously (from the
“bottom up”), with the understanding that the claims or issues are
interdependent, in that agreement on all of them is necessary to resolve
any of them, which is what typically happens when parties negotiate a
payment grid to support a settlement claims program.31 Tradeoffs can be
explicit (“I will accept ‘x’ on issue ‘A’ but only if you pay ‘y’ on issue
‘B’”), or can occur implicitly, as part of the ebb and flow of
negotiations, in which parties are expected to prioritize and fight harder
on some issues than others.32 Logically, the more issues or categories of
claims the parties need to resolve, the more opportunities they have for
tradeoffs.
Resolving competing claims to a fund may entail a conflict even if
plaintiffs’ counsel are genuinely motivated only by a desire to link
payouts to relative claim values. However, when negotiating settlements,
common benefit counsel are invariably concerned with more than just
relative claim value. Because defendants condition class settlements on
buy-in through “tip-over” provisions (pursuant to which opt-outs over
“x” percent of the class give the defendant a basis to cancel the
settlement), class counsel naturally feel pressure to spread settlement

and control); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1186–92
(1982) (providing an early taxonomy of class conflicts).
31. See Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving Landscape,
44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 306–10 (2015) (evaluating existing definitions of aggregate settlements
and offering a new normative framework); Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate
Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1813–14 (2005).
32. See Shaheen Fatima, Michael Woolridge & Nicholas R. Jennings, Optimal Negotiation of
Multiple Issues in Incomplete Information Settings, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 3, at 1 (2004) https://
eprints.soton.ac.uk/259552/1/aamas04shaheen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LRD8-99SJ]
(“Generally
speaking, there are two ways of negotiating multiple issues. One approach is to discuss all the issues
together as a package deal. The other approach is to settle each issue independently of all the other
issues.” (emphasis in original)). See generally Peyman Faratin, Carles Sierra & Nicholas R.
Jennings, Using Similarity Criteria to Make Negotiation Tradeoffs, in PROCEEDINGS, FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS (2000) https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/
253738/1/icmas00.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6AH-RLB8].
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payments to inspire maximum participation. Depending on the case, this
could mean transferring payments that would have been made to highvalue claimants to relatively low-value claimants,33 or the opposite
dynamic in cases where low-value claims are too small to economically
litigate individually.34
In the first few decades of the modern era, from 1966 to the early
1990s, the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) did
little to regulate such conflicts, and more generally posed a relatively
low bar to certification, requiring only that: representative plaintiffs be
members of the class,35 they not have interests “antagonistic” to those of
the class, and they retain competent counsel.36 The requirement of
“membership” in the class, as applied, tended to bleed into Rule
23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement, i.e., that the named plaintiff “possess
the same interest and suffer the same injury”37 as the class members.
That inquiry, in turn, focused on the class representative’s status or the
relief sought.38 The further requirement that class representatives not
have interests “antagonistic” to those of the class sounds like it created a
space for a nuanced assessment of conflicts of interest, but, as applied in
the pre-Amchem era, was read along the lines contemplated by the Court

33. See Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L.
REV. 301, 309–10 (2004) (citing prospect theory to explain why individuals with low dollar claims
may be relatively less risk-preferring, so that funds have to be transferred to them from relatively
risk-averse high-value claimants in order to induce them to settle). The think tank RAND
documented a similar dynamic in asbestos litigation, where counsel with contractual aggregates
packaged low and high dollar claims together, transferring amounts from the top to the bottom of
the claim value pyramid in such clusters. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION
23 (2005).
34. See, e.g., In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig. v. Thomson Corp., 654
F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011) (objectors successfully argued that named class representatives with
stronger claims negotiated a settlement through counsel that potentially transferred value from the
mass of relatively low-value claims to the higher claims); infra notes 80–88 and accompanying text.
35. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1982) (plaintiff with promotion claim
may not maintain a Rule 23 action on behalf of a class of person with hiring claims).
36. See, e.g., In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975)) (“[C]ourts generally decline to consider conflicts at the
outset, unless the conflict is apparent and at the very heart of the suit.”); Hedges Enters., Inc. v.
Cont’l Grp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 461, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting Sley v. Jam. Water & Util., Inc., 77
F.R.D. 391, 394 (E.D. Pa. 1977)) (“[T]he mere fact that a representative plaintiff stands in a
different factual posture is not sufficient to refuse certification. . . . The atypicality or conflict must
be clear and must be such that the interests of the class are placed in significant jeopardy.”
(alteration added)).
37. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1183 n.7 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff whose
equitable relief claims had been mooted was inadequate to represent a class of persons seeking
primarily equitable relief).
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in Hansberry, i.e., as asking whether the representative plaintiff shared
the class members’ “objectives.”39 When assessing counsel’s
competency pre-Amchem, lower federal courts did not rigorously review
to see if the class was sufficiently cohesive for counsel to be loyal to it
and instead focused on counsel’s experience, knowledge, and resources.
Counsel’s competency was rarely subject to successful challenge by
defendants opposing class certification.40 In the settlement context, class
counsel’s adequacy could be assessed by reference to the settlement
terms; if the terms themselves were deemed to be fair, reasonable, and
adequate, the trial court could “fairly assume that they were negotiated
by competent and adequate counsel.”41
But this same period witnessed two key innovations with regard to
Rule 23 that eventually placed pressure on what had been, up until that
time, a relatively relaxed approach to assessing adequacy. First, courts
increasingly certified classes outside the traditional areas contemplated
by the Rule’s drafters, e.g., civil rights and other cases seeking
injunctive relief and low-dollar or “negative value” damages suits.42
Courts certified classes even in mass torts involving personal injuries,
where the cases at least in theory could be pursued on an individual
basis.43 Second, courts became increasingly open to a variation of the
“issue” class in which a class is certified for the limited purpose of
evaluating and entering judgment upon a settlement.44 In such
circumstances, the defendant typically agrees to certification of a
39. See, e.g., Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Ed., 117 F.R.D. 394, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (citing
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1940)).
40. See, e.g., Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 161 (D. Kan. 1996) (“In the absence of proof to
the contrary, courts presume that class counsel is competent and sufficiently experienced to
vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of the class.”); In re Computer Memories Sec. Litig., 111
F.R.D. 675, 681 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (“Defendants do not dispute the competency of plaintiffs’
counsel, and this Court finds that plaintiffs’ counsel have ample experience and expertise in
bringing securities fraud class action suits.”).
41. See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 152 (D. Ohio 1992) (citing and quoting In
re Corrugated Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981)).
42. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617–18 (1997).
43. See Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 858, 859 (1995) (noting that the fact of large-scale class settlements of asbestos
and silicone gel implant claims “makes it evident that the class action has landed like a 600-pound
gorilla in the arena of tort reform, where there has been increasing interest in replacing tort litigation
with scheduled benefits like those provided in these class action settlements”); Judith Resnik, From
“Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 17–21 (1991) (reviewing the increasing
willingness of courts to certify mass tort class actions in the years after the 1966 revisions to Rule
23).
44. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 618 (“Among current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the
‘settlement only’ class has become a stock device.”).
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settlement class as part of a settlement agreement resolving the class
members’ claims, but without waiving its right to object to certification
of a litigation class in the event the settlement is not approved or
otherwise does not become final.45
It was in that spirit of adventuresomeness46 and innovation that lower
federal courts looked to Rule 23 as a solution to the largest mass tort in
history. By the early 1990s, the federal system faced an asbestos
litigation crisis. The Chief Justice wrote in a 1991 Report:
The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be
briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts
continue to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; the
same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed
the victims’ recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets
threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants may lose
altogether.47
In Amchem, the trial court approved a voluntary, Rule 23(b)(3)
damages settlement class seen by the proponents as providing a global
resolution to the crisis in the form of a negotiated claims program—a
grid that specified payment ranges for qualifying injuries.48 The parties
in Ortiz tried a different approach, certification of a mandatory
settlement class under Rule 23(b)(2) to equitably allocate available
funds.49
B.

Amchem’s Blueprint for Identifying and Managing Class Conflicts

Though the settlements in Amchem and Ortiz raised distinct issues,
partly because they involved different types of settlement classes,50 they
45. Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV.
951, 95758 (2014).
46. Id. at 617–19. See generally JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE
CASE STUDIES 20–24 (1998) (reviewing the history of mass tort settlement class actions); David
Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 587, 652 (2013) (noting period in the 1990s when courts saw class actions as the “cureall” for mass torts).
47. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 599 (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD
HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 23 (1991)).
48. Id. at 603 (describing the settlement as “an administrative mechanism and a schedule of
payments to compensate class members who meet defined asbestos-exposure and medical
requirements”).
49. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 827 (1999).
50. In Amchem, the Court confronted the proper standard for assessing settlement classes and the
application of Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
521 U.S. at 591. In Ortiz, the Court confronted the definition of a 23(b)(2) “limited fund.” Ortiz,
527 U.S. at 827.
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prompted a majority of Justices in each case to articulate and reinforce a
common vision of the requirement of adequate representation as it
pertained to the intra-class conflicts of interest. In both decisions, the
Court applied the idea of a fundamental conflict broadly to include
allocation conflicts stemming from varying claim strength or value,
adopted a market or incentive-based approach to managing such
conflicts by aligning counsel’s and subclass members’ interests, and
privileged intrinsic process values over utilitarian concerns with fair
outcomes.
First, the Court defined conflicts broadly to include divergent
preferences regarding allocation of settlement proceeds.51 For example,
in both cases, the interests of persons who had already experienced
asbestos-related injuries in receiving immediate compensation tugged
against the interests of exposure-only claimants in ensuring the existence
of adequate funding to pay for later-manifesting injuries.52 Similarly,
though less appreciated, persons with claims of sufficiently varying
value, such as persons whose claims were and were not covered by
defendant’s insurance policy in Ortiz, could not be adequately
represented by the same plaintiffs and counsel.53 Second, the Court
identified subclassing with separate counsel as a preferred solution for
such conflicts.54 Because the district court in each case failed to take
steps “at the outset” to provisionally certify subclasses with separate
counsel for such “easily identifiable categories of claimants,” there was
no “structural assurance” of adequate representation during the
negotiations that led to the settlements.55 Third, the Court rejected what
it perceived as efforts to substitute an evaluation of a settlement’s
fairness for an evaluation of conflicts of interest and their proper
management.56 The Court demonstrated a “stubborn”57 commitment to
51. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 393–94 (reading Amchem to require that “allocations have to be
bargained out among subclasses”).
52. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856; Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 627.
53. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857 (“Pre-1959 claimants accordingly had more valuable claims than post1959 claimants.”).
54. Id. at 856 (“[I]t is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and
future claims . . . requires division into homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with
separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.”).
55. Id. at 83132, 857.
56. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 622 (“Federal courts, in any case, lack authority to
substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria a standard never adopted—that if a settlement is ‘fair,’
then certification is proper.”).
57. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Adequacy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 55, 55 (2010) (“There’s
something admirably stubborn about the Supreme Court’s Amchem opinion. Despite being
presented with a paradigm of efficiency—a global settlement for present and future claims in the
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the intrinsic value of procedural fairness when it overturned the asbestos
settlements in each case.
Viewed only in the context of the asbestos litigation crisis that gave
rise to them, Amchem and Ortiz make little sense. Why would the Court
fuss about imperfect alignment of interests in a system that appeared to
be deeply broken on so many other dimensions?58 The decisions come
into sharper focus when viewed in the broader context of late twentieth
century institutional arrangements for managing mass torts, and the
theory of class conflicts and their management that appealed to the
sensibilities of that era. That context explains why the Court adopted a
market approach to conflict management that emphasized the intrinsic
value of structural fairness.
At the end of the twentieth century, federal institutional arrangements
for managing mass tort and other geographically dispersed wrongs were
largely ineffective. Due largely to jurisdictional constraints, federal
courts were relatively small and weak fish in a sea of federal and state
court judges. Mass torts were often grounded in state law, and federal
courts’ diversity jurisdiction could easily be undermined by destroying
complete diversity with the addition of plaintiffs who were citizens of
defendant’s state of incorporation, or by selecting plaintiffs who did not
individually meet the minimum amount in controversy necessary for the
federal courts to have diversity jurisdiction. This left much mass tort
litigation pending on a class basis in state courts,59 where the judges
were perceived to be less sophisticated and to have a sometimes-cavalier
attitude toward class certification, e.g., by certifying litigation classes on

elephantine asbestos litigation—the Court held that class attorneys could adequately represent only
a class with sufficient cohesion.”); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle
Continues, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 373 (1997) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 628)
(“The Third Circuit and the Supreme Court have interceded to spare the ‘unselfconscious and
amorphous legions’ of asbestos victims and their families the indignity to their legal due process
rights that might have accompanied the prospect for monetary compensation in their lifetimes
offered by the $1 billion-plus settlement.”).
58. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1476 (2005) (“In the case of Amchem, the perfect was the enemy of the good: the multibillion-dollar
settlement, rejected by the Supreme Court, was lost forever, and thousands of claimants who would
gladly have traded their pristine due process rights for substantial monetary compensation have been
consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes asbestos bankruptcies.”).
59. See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of
It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 145–49 (2002) (describing the “anomaly” of
pre-CAFA complete diversity and minimum amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 that kept many nationwide class actions out of federal court).
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the pleadings, without proof that the criteria for certification had been
met.60
The belief in class action lawyers’ ability to choose plaintiffs and
forum shop, including via the identification of “outlier” state court
judges willing to aggressively use Rule 23,61 gave lawyers the
appearance of control.62 But the same mechanism that gave plaintiffs’
attorneys the appearance of strength functioned as their Achilles heel:
because their role as class counsel was contingent upon a court
certifying the class and rendering a class judgment, and because other
camps of plaintiffs’ counsel could easily file in a competing jurisdiction,
settle with the defendant, and scoop the case, plaintiffs’ counsel
experienced an intense and existential form of role-insecurity. Their
investment in class litigation could at any moment be wiped out by an
interloper, leading to what leading commentators saw as the most
glaring ethical lapse of the era, the reverse auction.63 Reverse auctions
occurred when defendants pitted competing camps of plaintiffs’ counsel
against each other, awarding the role of settlement class counsel to the
lowest bidder.64

60. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1597 (2008) (noting that CAFA was driven in part by mistrust of state court judges). But see PUBLIC
CITIZEN, CLASS ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING 2 (2005),
https://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BUS4-8ZA6]
(“[T]his
report shows that empirical evidence is extremely thin with respect to state court jurisdictions that
are ‘judicial hellholes’ for class actions.”).
61. Jay Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 700–01 (2013) (describing the
standard narrative of class practice in state courts as a “caricature”).
62. See, e.g., In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 229 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that one key
aim of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (1995) was to shift control over litigation from
class counsel to lead institutional investors).
63. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 16, at 1370–73 (explaining the reverse auction scenario); Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 811–13 (1997) (same); Marcel
Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998) (same); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling
Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000) (“[D]ueling class actions enhance the pressure to
settle and increase the likelihood of inadequate settlements.”).
64. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282–83 (7th Cir. 2002) (defining and
explaining the “reverse auction” problem); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause the court does not appoint a class counsel until the case
is certified, attorneys jockeying for position might attempt to cut a deal with defendants by
underselling the plaintiffs’ claims relative to other attorneys.”); BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS
E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 14 (2005)
(“‘Reverse Auction’ is the label for a defendant’s collusive selection of the weakest attorney among
a number of plaintiff attorneys who have filed lawsuits dealing with the same subject matter; in
other words, a reverse auction is the ‘sale’ of a settlement to the lowest bidder among counsel for
competing or overlapping classes.”).
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This role-insecurity was seen as worsening two types of lawyer-client
conflicts, the incentive plaintiffs’ lawyers acting for aggregates have to
settle prematurely and also to trade class benefits for control and/or fees.
Entrepreneurial, profit-maximizing plaintiffs’ counsel are naturally
willing to invest less in plaintiffs’ claims than plaintiffs would prefer.
The lawyers’ recovery (the fee) is only a percentage of plaintiffs’
recovery, such that the lawyers have the incentive to invest only as long
as additional dollars of investment exceed the lawyers’ opportunity
costs; whereas plaintiffs would like that higher level of investment that
maximizes their expected recovery. Moreover, the lawyers have more at
stake, and are thus more risk-averse, because they typically advance
their time and costs. For these reasons, lawyers and clients’ case
investment preferences systematically skew.65 The underinvestment/
premature settlement problem just described is distinct from the sellout
problem, where lawyers, given the opportunity, might take actions to
increase their fees at clients’ expense, e.g., by negotiating a settlement
that involves reduced payments to clients but enhanced fees or other
benefits for the lawyers. Both problems exist in all contingent fee
settings.66 Add to that the difficulty relatively disenfranchised or absent
clients have monitoring lawyers acting on their behalf, and such lawyers
have both the incentive and the ability to peg investment at lower
amounts than clients prefer, and to increase their fees at clients’
expense.67 These ever-present ethical challenges are exacerbated when
counsel experience role-insecurity. The lawyers’ expected fee is reduced
by the possibility of being scooped by competing proposed class
counsel, further depressing investment; and the status of settlement class
counsel is for sale, paid by winning lawyers by trading away client
recoveries.
Under those circumstances, a picture of class actions as both lawyerdriven and deeply flawed emerged. One of its chief elaborators was
65. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 41–49 (1985); Charles Silver & Lynn A.
Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 751
(1997) (describing threat of underinvestment by counsel).
66. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 537–46 (1978) (building on the Schwartz & Mitchell economic analysis of
attorney investment incentives under contingent fee contracts); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B.
Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1125, 1133–36 (1970) (elaborating economic analysis that predicts systematic
underinvestment by contingent fee lawyers).
67. This is the traditional and prevailing account of the entrepreneurial lawyer. For a critique, see
generally Morris A. Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757
(2012).
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Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., whose work the Supreme Court cited in
both Amchem and Ortiz.68 Coffee saw the entrepreneurial (profitmaximizing) plaintiffs’ attorney, not the class representative, as the
driving force behind class actions, mapped the divergence between the
interests of lawyer and class members, and recognized class members’
inability and unwillingness to effectively monitor class counsel given
their asymmetric stakes.69 Professor Coffee couched all of this in an
agency cost framework,70 identifying as a goal the management of
agency costs.71 This, he explained, could be achieved by aligning the
interests of profit-maximizing agents and their principals to minimize
the loss in welfare experienced by the principal (the class) as a result of
the agent’s (class counsel’s) disloyalty.72 This agency cost lens quickly
captured the imagination of scholars and courts and now serves as the
traditional, though not exclusive,73 conceptual framework for thinking
68. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). It is important to note that while
the Court was clearly influenced by Professor Coffee’s writings, Professor Coffee himself was
critical of the framework the Court announced in Amchem and Ortiz. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note
30, at 373–74 (noting that the approach taken in Amchem and Ortiz “risks two inconsistent dangers:
(1) it may do too little, and (2) it may do too much,” the former danger stemming from the
continuing viability of settlement classes, and the latter from the fact that “an expansive reading of
Amchem and Ortiz threatens the viability of the class action across a broad range of litigation
contexts”). It is thus not at all surprising that Professor Coffee later testified in support of
settlements, described below, that this Article presents as inconsistent with the Amchem regime. See
infra note 218.
69. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d
1040, 1057 n.13 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting RUBENSTEIN, supra note 6, § 3.52) (“[I]n small claims
cases [class representatives] have so little at stake that it would be irrational for them to take more
than a tangential interest, while in all cases, including larger claim cases, class representatives
generally lack the legal acumen to make key decisions about complex class action litigation, much
less to monitor savvy class counsel.”).
70. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669, 684–90 (1986) (“Agency costs” are the sum of monitoring expenditures by the principal,
bonding expenditures by the agent, and the loss in welfare experienced by the principal due to the
“divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare
of the principal”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12–27
(1991) (defining agency cost theory and applying it to class and derivative claims).
71. Coffee, supra note 70, at 726 (“[T]he basic goal of reform should be to reduce the agency
costs incident to this attorney-client relationship.”).
72. Id.
73. Though the agency cost frame is most consistent with traditional class conflicts doctrine,
commentators have proposed other intriguing lenses for thinking about conflicts and adequacy of
representation. See, e.g., Myria Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104–05 (2006)
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about class conflicts, and was certainly the dominant conceptual lens
when the Supreme Court decided Amchem and Ortiz.
Thus, at the time it decided Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme Court
faced a landscape in which federal courts seemed poorly situated to
regulate the quality of multijurisdictional class actions, class counsel’s
self-seeking stood out as the central problem, and agency cost theory
provided the conceptual framework for providing a conflictsmanagement solution. Building on that foundation, the Court was
naturally drawn to find some way to strengthen the adequacy of
representation inquiry using a market or incentive-based frame, one that
looked to the manipulation of counsel’s incentives.74 The Court
accomplished its goal by stating what read like a clear approach to class
conflicts: denial of class certification in the absence of subclassing with
separate counsel whose fees turned on the subclass’s fortunes.
But conflicts law is by nature far less categorical. Different doctrines
regulating lawyer conflicts can be brought to bear in any particular
circumstance.75 All conflicts analysis is, at root, a form of riskassessment,76 i.e., a consideration of the risk that an agent or fiduciary
(calling the agency cost problem in small claims class action a “mirage” because the focus in such
cases should be on optimal deterrence rather than on optimal compensation); Jay Tidmarsh,
Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2009) (drawing on moral
philosophy and economics to assess adequacy by reference to whether “representation makes class
members no worse off than they would have been if they had engaged in individual litigation”).
Similarly, as discussed in section II.C.5 below, lower federal courts have searched for alternatives to
incentive-based or “economic” models of conflicts management.
74. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“The policy at the very core of the class action
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.”).
75. Compare Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 625 (using Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of
representation requirement to analyze conflicts that might justify denial of certification or
subclassing), with Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999) (on a motion to
disqualify class counsel, analyzing alleged conflict through the lens of ethics doctrine adapted to the
class setting).
76. Risk assessment is the foundation of conflicts analysis in a range of settings, including under
the relevant ethics rules. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 71–72 (1996) (“Although various purposes have been ascribed to them,
the ‘conflict rules’ are best understood as rules of ‘risk avoidance.’ They address situations in which
there is a risk that a lawyer will not adequately carry out obligations to a present or a former client
because competing obligations to another present or former client or because of the lawyer’s own
competing interests.” (internal citation omitted)). Risk assessment also anchors court consideration
of motions to disqualify opposing counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946, 954–55
(7th Cir. 2010) (finding the risk of conflict insufficiently severe to justify a trial court order
disqualifying counsel). Similarly, risk assessment is the foundation of conflicts analysis under Rule
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will be disloyal as a result of competing duties to members of the
aggregate or the fiduciary’s own interests. Implicit in all conflicts
doctrine is an understanding that the risk need not be reduced to zero.
Instead, conflicts should be managed to a point that depends on the costs
and benefits. Amchem and Ortiz adopted that same approach by noting
that conflicts had to be sufficiently fundamental to require subclassing
with separate counsel.77 The Court did not precisely define which
conflicts were “fundamental,”78 and did not identify subclassing as the
exclusive method for managing conflicts. Thus, as the next Section
describes, the Court’s seemingly muscular blueprint for managing class
conflicts—i.e., an expansive definition of actionable conflicts,
subclassing with separate counsel as the preferred response, and a
commitment to intrinsic fairness values—contained the seeds of its own
undoing.
II.

A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REVOLT

A person reading Amchem and Ortiz in the late 1990s would have
been hard-pressed to predict how they have been applied to a changing
complex litigation landscape. Especially, though not exclusively, in the
very mass tort practice setting that gave rise to those decisions, the
Court’s decisions are experiencing death by a thousand cuts. With few
exceptions providing a veil of vitality, discussed below, the lower
federal courts have steadily limited Amchem and Ortiz to a crimped read
of their facts; narrowly defined the kinds of fundamental conflicts that
warrant subclassing; accepted alternative structural assurances of
fairness to avoid subclassing when they could not distinguish Amchem
and Ortiz on their facts; and looked to the substantive adequacy of the

23. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980) (framing the risk
assessment for purposes of determining whether representation is adequate as follows:
“[r]epresentative suits carry with them an accepted structural risk that conflicts may arise between
groups of class members. It may be unavoidable that some class members will always be happier
with a given result than others, but potential injustice arises as the distribution of benefits and
burdens in a class remedy becomes increasingly unequal”); Hernandez v. Cty. of Monterey, 305
F.R.D. 132, 160 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (assessing adequacy of representation in a class action in terms of
the risk that a conflict would materialize).
77. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 636 (cautioning that trial courts should consider the costs of
subclassing when exercising discretion to create subclasses).
78. Professor Miller’s 2003 comment is apt today: “[g]iven the widespread recognition of the
problems conflicts of interest in class action litigation, one might suppose that decisionmakers
would have developed a workable and well-understood doctrine for assessing these problems.
Surprisingly, however, the courts have not articulated coherent principles to guide their analysis.”
Miller, supra note 16, at 582.
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settlement as proof of procedural fairness, bringing a utilitarian Trojan
horse into the adequacy of representation analysis.79
A.

Exceptions that Mask the Trend

Three veils give Amchem and Ortiz the appearance of vitality. First,
the Second Circuit has recently been the flag bearer of an atypically
strict reading of those decisions. In Literary Works,80 plaintiffs’ counsel
in consolidated proceedings represented a single class of freelance
authors who sold works to hardcopy print publishers that were later
published online settled the claims of copyright infringement with regard
to the online publications.81 The settlement divided the works at issue
into three categories, A–C. Category A and B works were registered and
thus the copyright claims were relatively more valuable. Category C
works were not registered and could only be litigated for damages if they
were registered, in which case, they would share the same value as
Category B claims.82 More than ninety-nine percent of the claims were
category C claims, though many of the Category A and B claimholders
also had Category C claims. The same counsel represented all three
categories of claims, and negotiated a settlement that, not surprisingly,
was disproportionately generous with respect to the more valuable A and
B claims.83 The trial court rejected objectors’ claims of conflicts between
on the one hand, the Category A and B claims and on the other the
Category C claims.84 The Second Circuit reversed, noting that allocation
conflicts based on varying claim value could rise to the level of a
fundamental conflict requiring subclassing,85 and that subclassing with
separate counsel was the preferred mechanism for assuring structural
fairness in this case.86
The Second Circuit explained why having a neutral participate in
allocation decisions cannot substitute for the market-based approach it
found Amchem and Ortiz to require:

79. See infra notes 256–77 and accompanying text.
80. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig. v. Thomson Corp., 654 F.3d 242 (2d
Cir. 2011).
81. Id. at 245.
82. Id. at 246.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 247.
85. Id. at 249–52.
86. Id. at 253.
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The Supreme Court counseled in Ortiz that subclasses may be
necessary when categories of claims have different settlement
values. The rationale is simple: how can the value of any
subgroup of claims be properly assessed without independent
counsel pressing its most compelling case? It is for this reason
that the participation of impartial mediators and institutional
plaintiffs does not compensate for the absence of independent
representation. Although the mediators safeguarded the
negotiation process, and the institutional plaintiffs watched out
for the interests of the class as a whole, no one advanced the
strongest arguments in favor of Category C’s recovery.87
The circuit court therefore required separate counsel for the Category C
claims and sent the case back so that the properly represented parties
could renegotiate the settlement.88 They did, resulting in submission to
the trial court of a revised settlement that was far more generous to
Category C claimants, without reducing settlement payouts for Category
A or B claims.89
More recently, in Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant
Discount Antitrust Litigation,90 the Second Circuit doubled down on this
relatively aggressive read of Amchem and Ortiz, overturning the largest
cash antitrust settlement in U.S. history on the ground that representation
was inadequate.91 In that case, the same lawyers represented a Rule
23(b)(3) opt-out settlement class of persons who accepted Visa or
MasterCard prior to November 28, 2012, and, also, a separate mandatory
Rule 23(b)(2) settlement class of persons who accepted Visa or
MasterCard after that date.92 The court found that the interests of the two
settlement classes conflicted, in that persons in the (b)(3) class were
focused on maximizing the payment of cash, whereas persons in the
(b)(2) class were focused on obtaining relatively more generous
injunctive relief.93 The court found that the injunctive relief class, which
received only temporary relief, but released its claims in perpetuity, lost
87. Id.
88. Id. at 25758.
89. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., MDL No. 1379, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50143 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (preliminary approval order).
90. 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016).
91. Id. at 234 (quoting In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986
F. Supp. 2d 207, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)) (“The (up to) $7.25 billion in relief for the (b)(3) class was
the ‘largest-ever cash settlement in an antitrust class action.’”).
92. The date was significant because the court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement on
November 27, 2012. Id. at 229.
93. Id. at 233–34.
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that tug-of-war,94 one grounded in the opportunity counsel had to trade
claims for one group to grease the wheels of settlement for another.95
The court went out of its way to “emphatically”96 reinforce the argument
made in Literary Works that active involvement of a neutral in
settlement discussions was not an adequate alternative assurance of
fairness.97
The Second Circuit is an outlier.98 No other circuit court has adopted
such a strong and straightforward read of Amchem’s requirement of
subsclassing to address intra-class conflicts regarding allocation. Not all
decisions emanating from that circuit hew as forcefully to the Amchem
framework. For example, in Charron v. Wiener,99 a 2013 decision, the
Second Circuit read Literary Works as applying with special force when
settlement class certification precedes certification of a litigation class,100
and only where claims were both released and “disfavored”101 under the
settlement’s terms, putting a utilitarian gloss on the decision that could
profoundly limit its impact, as explained below. In City of Livonia
Employees’ Retirement System v. Wyeth,102 the trial court found Literary
Works inapplicable even when a class of (low dollar) claims was
disfavored as long as the settlement term was characterized as a

94. Id. at 234 (“The trouble with unitary representation here is exacerbated because the members
of the worse-off (b)(2) class could not opt out.”).
95. Id. (“The class counsel and class representatives who negotiated and entered into the
Settlement Agreement were in the position to trade diminution of (b)(2) relief for increase of (b)(3)
relief.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Supplemental Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. ¶ 22, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012), ECF No. 7726-4 [hereinafter Coffee Supplemental Declaration]
(describing Literary Works as “the decision that has taken the strongest, most activist stance
requiring subclasses”).
99. 731 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2013).
100. Id. at 250 (“As a preliminary matter, we note that unlike the situation in Amchem, Ortiz, and
In re Literary Works, the settlement here was not being approved at the same time that the class was
being certified. Where settlement and certification proceed simultaneously, courts must give
heightened attention to the requirements of Rule 23(a).”); see also In re Payment Card Interchange
Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Charron on
the ground that Charron it did not involve a settlement approved at the same time as class
certification).
101. Charron, 731 F.3d at 252 (“This case therefore does not present the situation the Supreme
Court faced in Amchem, Ortiz, and In re Literary Works, where the defendants were released from
liability on certain claims that the settlements disfavored.”).
102. No. 07 Civ. 10329 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113658 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013).
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“distribution threshold,”103 i.e., a minimum value of claim below which
no payment would be made. And in Laumann v. NHL,104 the trial court
limited Literary Works to (b)(3) cases involving allocation of monetary
funds.105
Second, the conflicts management regime articulated in Amchem and
Ortiz has the veneer of robustness because intermediate appellate courts
outside the Second Circuit still do reverse trial courts for failing to
address conflicts via subclassing. But these decisions typically involve
the types of direct and complete conflicts that were deemed
impermissible before Amchem and Ortiz,106 or are rendered in cases
where the need for subclassing is proved by the presence of unfair
settlement terms, precisely the kind of inquiry Amchem rejects.107
Finally, lower federal courts still regularly exercise discretion to
certify subclasses. They often do so in order to make the litigation more
manageable rather than to address adequacy concerns.108 When
103. Id. at *910 (“Literary Works . . . does not displace the string of precedent favoring
distribution thresholds.”).
104. 105 F. Supp. 3d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
105. Id. at 404 n.73.
106. These cases are often just variations on the facts of Hansberry. Examples include cases in
which some class members actually benefit from the challenged conduct. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 2003) (class included both end user
purchasers of drug and wholesalers, but wholesalers benefitted from the challenged conduct,
prompting the court to note: “[t]o our knowledge, no circuit has approved of class certification
where some class members derive a net economic benefit from the very same conduct alleged to be
wrongful by the named representatives of the class”). In the same vein are cases in which a
proposed class includes persons who do and do not have continuing business relationships that
tether their interests to those of the defendant, such as classes that include both present and former
franchisees. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338–39 (4th
Cir. 1998) (overturning certification of a litigation class on the ground that representation was
inadequate; noting the conflict between present and former franchisees regarding the remedy, given
that present franchisees have a stake in the franchise’s continued health; and noting the even more
pressing conflict on the facts of this case between two groups of plaintiffs over the measure of
damages).
107. Examples include recent Third Circuit decisions that both sharply limit Amchem and Ortiz
and, at the same time, reverse certification in cases where unfair settlement terms evidence
counsel’s disloyalty. Two such cases—Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d
Cir. 2012) and In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 346–48 (3d Cir. 2010)—are
discussed infra in section II.C.
108. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Because we are
reviewing the district court’s certifications under an abuse of discretion standard, we affirm.
Nevertheless, it seems that the plaintiffs could comfortably be split into two Subclasses based on
their reimbursement scheme” for purposes of making the litigation more manageable); Perry v.
Equity Residential Management, LLC, 12–10779–RWZ, 2014 WL 4198850, at *6–7, *10 (D. Mass.
Aug. 26, 2014) (certifying three litigation subclasses, and noting that in general subclasses “may
help make the case more manageable,” and that “creation of subclasses may circumvent
commonality problems,” but appointing the same lawyers counsel for all three subclasses).
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adequacy of representation motivates the courts’ exercise of discretion to
subclass, it is often a motivation that disappears at the time of settlement.
By way of example, in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,109 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s certification of a
litigation class and remanded for discovery regarding a possible conflict
of interest between class members who were injured and benefitted by
the challenged conduct. The case settled on remand, and the trial court
certified a single settlement class, finding that the fact of settlement
mooted conflicts concerns.110
The strength of the regulatory regime announced by the Court in
Amchem and Ortiz is best measured not by the extent to which lower
courts feel they may subclass, but by the extent to which they feel they
must do so to manage conflicts. The case studies presented by way of
example in the following section illustrate the degree to which the
foundation of the intra-class conflicts management regime of Amchem
and Ortiz has been hollowed out.
B.

Two Case Studies

Two recent case studies highlight the bankruptcy of the Amchem
framework for regulating intra-class conflicts of interest. In both, class
members’ divergent interests regarding the design and allocation of any
eventual settlement were apparent at the outset of the litigation.
Nevertheless, the trial and intermediate appellate courts either found an
absence of conflicts, or found that any conflicts were insufficiently
fundamental to warrant any subclassing or more than minimal
subclassing. This subsection lays out the intra-class allocation conflicts.
The following subsection identifies the arguments used by the courts in
these and other cases to avoid or minimize subclassing with separate
counsel, and, indeed, to upend and reframe the conflicts management
regime outlined in Amchem and Ortiz.
The two case studies presented here cross jurisdictions and
substantive law settings. Each settlement or cluster of settlements is,
though imperfect, impressive on a number of dimensions. The BP class
settlements discussed below set a new gold standard, both on the merits
with more-than-full compensation of many categories of claims, and in
terms of the settlement’s design, with claims processes negotiated and
disclosed in advance, making it one of the most transparent mass tort
109. 350 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003).
110. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99-MDL-1317-SEITZ/KLEIN, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43082, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2005) (granting final approval).
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settlements ever negotiated.111 Similarly, the class settlement of the NFL
concussion injury settlement was arguably generous given the
weaknesses of plaintiffs’ claims.112 Settlements so dazzling make it easy
to miss or overlook underlying intra-class conflicts.
1.

The BP Oil Spill Litigation

The blowout, explosion, and fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig on April 20, 2010, and the resulting oil spill and cleanup
effort, together comprise one of the largest environmental mass torts in
U.S. history.113 The resulting oil spill contaminated the Gulf region,
impacting natural resources (e.g., fish), property, and businesses and
individuals whose economic interests intersected with the region.114 The
cleanup efforts involved the use of allegedly toxic oil dispersants,
exposing cleanup workers to a range of short and long term illnesses.115
These economic, property, and personal injuries gave rise to legal claims
sounding in federal and state law.116 Within four months of the blowout,
the Judicial Panel issued an order transferring and consolidating all
actions in the federal system alleging economic loss, property damage,
or personal injury claims to Judge Barbier in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.117

111. At one point, BP even unsuccessfully appealed the settlement when it became dissatisfied
with the settlement administrator’s and court’s interpretations of it. See In re Deepwater Horizon,
739 F.3d 790, 799 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting BP’s appeal).
112. In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 391–92 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(noting the risk that plaintiffs’ claims could be knocked out on defendants’ pending motion to
dismiss on preemption grounds).
113. In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (E.D. La. 2014)
(“It was not long after the initial explosions that the first lawsuits were filed. Since that time,
approximately 3,000 cases, with over 100,000 named claimants, have been filed in federal and state
courts across the nation.”).
114. LOU NADEAU ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE DEEPWATER OIL SPILL ON TOURISM IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
REGION 1 (2014).
115. Master Complaint in Accordance with PTO No. 11 [Case Management Order No. 1] Section
III.B(3) [“B3 Bundle”] ¶¶ 912, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010), ECF
No. 881.
116. Plaintiffs pursued federal statutory, general maritime, and state law claims, though the trial
court ultimately dismissed the state law claims. See Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss
the B1 Master Complaint] at 18, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. August 26, 2011),
ECF No. 3830.
117. Transfer Order, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-02179 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010), ECF No. 1.
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Faced with this “amorphous collection of claims”118 and the challenge
of managing them within the confines of a single MDL proceeding,
Judge Barbier immediately established an MDL leadership structure. He
appointed nineteen attorneys to serve as members of a plaintiffs’ steering
committee (“PSC”),119 tasked with coordination and implementation of
discovery; coordination of selection, management, and presentation of
common issue or bellwether trials; and the exploration and development
of “all settlement options” pertaining to any claim. 120 The court
recognized that the administratively consolidated proceedings involved
sufficiently distinct issues to warrant separate “pleading bundles” to
facilitate motions to dismiss, including a “B1” pleading bundle for
economic loss and a “B3” pleading bundle for personal injury claims.121
The nature, strength, and value of these claims turned on a few key
variables, including geography, type of profession, business or property,
available remedies, and whether personal injury plaintiffs had yet
manifested injuries. By way of example, claims that arose closer in time
or physical space to the spill or to contaminants were arguably stronger
than more temporally or physically remote claims.122 Pursuant to the

118. Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict
Litigation Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237, 237 (2011).
119. Judge Barbier appointed attorneys James P. Roy and Stephen J. Herman as interim liaison
counsel for the MDL, pending appointment of an MDL plaintiffs’ leadership structure. See Pretrial
Order No. 1 Setting Initial Conference at 13, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 20,
2010), ECF No. 2. The Court then formalized the appointment and made Roy and Herman ex officio
members of the PSC. Pretrial Order No. 6 at 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug.
27, 2010), ECF No. 110. After soliciting written applications, the court appointed fifteen additional
lawyers to the MDL PSC. See Pretrial Order No. 8 [Appointment of PSC and Plaintiffs’ Executive
Committee] at 1–2, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2010), ECF No. 506. One
year later, after reviewing “applications for appointment and re-appointment” to the PSC, the court
added as PSC members two additional persons. See Pretrial Order No. 46 [Appointing Plaintiffs’
Co-Liaison Counsel, Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, and Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee] at 1–2,
In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2011), ECF No. 4226. PSC membership has
remained largely constant throughout the litigation. See Order [Re-Appointing Plaintiffs’ Steering
and Executive Committee Members and Plaintiffs’ Co-Liaison Counsel], In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016), ECF No. 21767 (listing nearly all of the originally appointed
counsel).
120. See Pretrial Order No. 1 at 14–18, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 20,
2010), ECF No. 2; Pre-trial Order No. 8 at 3–4, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 8,
2010), ECF No. 506.
121. See infra note 335.
122. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the
Deepwater Horizon Spill, DIGITAL ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARVARD (Nov. 22, 2010),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4595438/Report%20on%20Economic%20Loss%20Liab
ility%2011%2022%2010.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/KY6R-KNZM] (analyzing the OPA and
discussing the relationship between concepts of “distance” and proximate cause).
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Court’s decision in Robins Dry Dock,123 punitive damages were
available to most economic loss claimants only if they were commercial
fishermen or suffered physical damages and resulting economic losses
associated with the spill.124 And persons who had already experienced
physical injuries were differently situated from those who had merely
been exposed or who had manifested minor injuries but were still
susceptible to more serious and perhaps latent ones.
The same undifferentiated group of lawyers appointed to the PSC at
the beginning of the MDL resolved large pieces of the litigation via a
series of class settlement agreements that made distinctions among
plaintiffs based on the key variables listed above. These distinctions
were obvious at the start of the proceedings given the experiences BP
and claimants had with the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) that
BP unilaterally established and that Ken Feinberg administered to pay
early individual settlements.125 The resulting class settlements have been
praised,126 partly because the payouts exceeding $11 billion are
impressive in the aggregate;127 but, as explained below, the settlements
were reached via a process that invited tradeoffs among differently
situated categories of class members.
The settling parties and the court acknowledged the need for distinct
classes with regard to BP on only two dimensions. First, building off its
123. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
124. The trial court ultimately allowed certain punitive damages claims to be pursued (against
Responsible Parties who satisfied the OPA presentment requirement and against non-Responsible
Parties) to the same extent they could be pursued before enactment of the Oil Pollution Act, i.e., by
“persons who suffered physical damage and resulting economic loss resulting from an oil spill,” or
where there was “gross negligence,” but not for purely economic losses “unaccompanied by
physical damage to a propriety interest,” per Robins Dry Dock. Order and Reasons [As to Motions
to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint] at 19, 27, 38, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La.
Aug. 26, 2011), ECF No. 3830 (citing Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 303).
125. See, e.g., BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY: REPORT OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 28–53
(2012), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EW9M-XQ4H] (describing claimants and claims procedures); Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus
Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund
Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 829–63 (2011) (describing genesis and structure of the GCCF).
126. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 399400 (2014) (praising the BP settlement).
127. See, e.g., Report by the Claims Administrator of the Deepwater Horizon Economic and
Property Damages Settlement Agreement on the Status of Claims Review, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10md-02179 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2017), ECF No. 22248 (summarizing payouts to class members);
Status Report from the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Settlement Claims Administrator, In re
Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2017), ECF No. 22245 (same); Order & Reasons
[Aggregate Common Benefit Fee and Costs Award] at 13–15, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02719
(E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2016), ECF No. 21849 (same).
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order requiring distinct master complaint pleading, the court certified
separate settlement classes resolving all economic loss/property damage
claims and oil cleanup worker personal injury claims against BP, which,
as part of the economic settlement, assigned its own claims against codefendants Halliburton and Transocean to the BP economic loss
settlement class.128 Second, in the subsequent punitive damages class
settlements with Halliburton and Transocean, the parties recognized the
need to distinguish between “Old Class” (BP economic loss settlement
class members with BP’s assigned claims against Halliburton and
Transocean) and “New Class” (persons with direct punitive damage
claims against Halliburton and Transocean).129
While each class had different named representative plaintiffs, the
same lawyers have been appointed to represent all four of the
aforementioned classes.130 These are thus not subclasses in the sense
imagined in Amchem and Ortiz, where subclass counsel’s desire to
maximize the attorney’s fee prompts them to seek to maximize the
subclass’s recovery, thereby creating a structural assurance of loyalty.
That vision is reflected in the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for
Complex Litigation, which assumes that if subclass counsel are
appointed after a settlement has been reached, the trial court should send
the parties back to renegotiate the settlement terms, with separate
counsel representing the subclasses and fighting for the right sized slices
of the pie.131 In a conflicts management regime informed by agency cost
theory, subclassification without separate representation elevates form
(subclassing) over function (managing conflicts) by leaving conflicted
counsel responsible for mediating the very tensions that prompted
subclassing.

128. See infra section II.B.1.a.
129. See infra section II.B.1.b.
130. Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed HESI and Transocean Punitive Damages
and Assigned Claims Class Action Settlements] at 30–31, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D.
La. Apr. 12, 2016), ECF No. 16183 [hereinafter PD Preliminary Approval Order] (appointing MDL
Co-Liaison Counsel and Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee members as Class Counsel for the Punitive
Damages Settlement Class). There is precedent for creating distinct classes without separate
counsel. For example, in In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149–51
(E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court crated five settlement classes to resolve a range of Holocaust-era claims
against Swiss banks and other entities, appointing the same counsel to each, in that instance in order
to avoid what the court feared would be unseemly competition among subclasses and subgroups
over a capped settlement fund. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18339, at *7–8, *44–45 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2007) (describing the unique circumstances of the
litigation that produced this arrangement).
131. See ANNOTATED MANUAL, supra note 6, at § 26.612, at 428.
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Two BP Settlement Classes with One Set of Counsel
i.

Economic Loss/Property Damage Settlement

While discovery and preparation for a trial on certain common issues
were under way, the PSC and BP negotiated two separate class action
settlements, one for economic and property losses and the other for
personal injuries.132 The trial court appointed different plaintiffs but the
same lawyers to represent both settlement classes.133
The economic loss and property damage settlement agreement
identifies fifteen named plaintiffs for a class that incorporates temporal
and geographic limits134 and requires claims to fall within specific
damage categories.135 For each of the eight broad damage categories, the
settlement agreement establishes detailed claims matrices or
“frameworks” distinguishing class members on multiple grounds.136
Some of the matrices are actually clusters of grids. For example, the
132. Order and Reasons [Granting Final Approval of the Economic and Property Damages
Settlement Agreement] at 23, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2012), ECF
No. 8138 [hereinafter Economic Final Approval Order].
133. After being informed that a settlement was imminent, Judge Barbier appointed the MDL
liaison counsel, Messrs. Roy and Herman, as interim class counsel. Order Appointing Interim Class
Counsel, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2012), ECF No. 5960. Shortly
thereafter, Judge Barbier appointed Roy and Herman as “Lead Economic and Property Damages
Class Counsel” and “Lead Medical Benefits Class Counsel.” The remaining seventeen lawyers
appointed to the MDL PSC were appointed as additional settlement class counsel for both classes.
Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damage Class Action
Settlement] at 33, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012), ECF No. 6418
[hereinafter Economic Preliminary Approval Order] (appointing Roy and Herman as Lead Class
Counsel and appointing the seventeen other PSC members as additional Class Counsel for the
Settlement Class); Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement] at 22–23, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012), ECF No. 6419
[hereinafter Personal Injury Preliminary Approval Order].
134. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 7 (“The geographic bounds of the
Settlement are Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and certain coastal counties in eastern Texas and
western Florida, as well as specified adjacent Gulf waters and bays. Generally, ‘[t]o be a class
member, an individual within the geographic area must have lived, worked, or owned or leased
property in the area between April 20, 2010, and April [16], 2012, and businesses must have
conducted activities in the area during that same time frame.’”).
135. The settlement recognizes six categories of damage: (1) specified types of economic loss for
businesses and individuals, (2) specified types of real property damage (coastal, wetlands, and real
property sales damage), (3) Vessel of Opportunity Charter Payment, (4) Vessel Physical Damage,
(5) Subsistence Damage, and (6) the Seafood Compensation Program. Economic Final Approval
Order, supra note 132, at 7.
136. See Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement as
Amended on May 2, 2012, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2010), ECF No.
6430-1 [hereinafter Economic Settlement Agreement]. For an overview of the settlement, see
Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 6–19.
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economic loss category includes separate frameworks for individuals
and businesses, and within the business category is further divided into
general, multi-facility, failed start-up, and start-up frameworks. Each
claims program framework is described in corresponding exhibits to the
settlement.
The BP economic loss settlement was claims-made and uncapped,
except for the Seafood Compensation Program, which was capped at
$2.3 billion.137 The matrices made payment amounts contingent on the
key variables identified above—time, geography, type of business or
profession, and available remedies—in three ways. These variables
dictated whether claimants needed to prove causation; the amount of the
available “risk transfer premium” or “RTP,” a multiplier meant to
account for, among other things, the risk of future losses as well as the
possibility of recovering punitive damages; and the settlement awards.
By manipulating these variables, the parties were able to estimate at the
time they negotiated the settlement terms the likely payouts at the back
end.138
Given the obviousness and range of variables used to discriminate
among economic loss/property damage class members for settlement
purposes, arguments could have been made in support of creating
multiple subclasses. Indeed, objectors did make such arguments. The
settling parties used geography as a proxy for claim strength when
deciding eligibility, proof requirements, and compensation within each
settlement matrix. An expert for one unusually sophisticated objector
testified that the Economic Loss Zones were drawn arbitrarily such that
similarly situated class members were treated differently.139 Another
group of objectors noted that Zone A and B members are entitled to
relatively higher RTPs, and that, even though approximately eighty-five
percent of the class members fell into Zones C and D, “[n]ot a single
named class representative falls within Zones C or D.”140 Other objectors
covered by the Wetlands Real Property Claim matrix noted that none of
the named plaintiffs with such claims resided outside Louisiana and

137. See Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 78.
138. See Economic Settlement Agreement, supra note 136.
139. Economist and financial analyst Marc Vellrath submitted a declaration supporting objections
by non-settling defendant Halliburton alleging conflicts within the economic loss “super-class.”
Declaration of Marc Vellrath Regarding the Proposed Economic & Property Damages Settlement
Agreement ¶¶ 3, 17, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF No. 91-2
[hereinafter Vellrath Decl. re Economic Settlement].
140. Consolidated Objections of 795 Unnamed Class Members to Deepwater Horizon Settlement
Agreement at 6–7, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 198.
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objected to the decision to limit eligibility to make such claims to
Louisiana property owners.141
Allocation tradeoffs were made not only by geographic zone but also
by profession or industry. For example, for individuals, the risk transfer
premium—a multiplier on grid awards—varied between zero and three
depending on both zone and industry, resulting in what one objector
characterized as arbitrary payment differences among claimants.142
Similarly, within the Seafood Compensation Program, claimants with
distinct positions in a particular industry had conflicting allocation
interests. The SCP compensated boat owners, lessees, captains, and crew
“roughly in proportion to their respective shares of or contribution to the
total value created through a vessel-captain-and-crew’s seafood
harvesting efforts.”143 So when negotiating the grid to allocate
compensation among them, each stakeholder would have wanted to see
more weight given to his sub-group’s contribution to value.
Counsel would also have been tempted to make tradeoffs among class
members based on their eligibility to recover punitive damages.
Recognizing that, objectors asserted allocation conflicts between those
class members whose claims supported punitive damages and those
whose claims did not. For example, writing about the Coastal Real
Property Damage subgroup, Sturdivant Objectors claimed:
Not a single class representative has a federal maritime claim—
or corresponding claim for punitive damages—for damage to
real property. As OPA-only claimants, the class representative
real property owners are not typical of class members, like
Objectors, who have federal maritime claims for damage to their
real property, which is the only way to recover punitive
damages.144

141. Objections and Memorandum in Support of MRI, LLC and Dauphin Island Property Owners
Association’s Objections to Proposed Settlement Agreement at 6, In re Oil Spill, No. 02:10-cv07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 144 (overall discussion is at pages 5–14); see also
Statement of Written Objections of Economic Class Member [Panther Ridge] at 2, 13–20, In re Oil
Spill, No. 02:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 190.
142. See Vellrath Decl. re Economic Settlement, supra note 139, ¶¶ 175–77.
143. Id. ¶¶ 223–24.
144. Objections Regarding Proposed Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement
[Sturdivant Objectors] at 3, 11–12, In re Oil Spill, No. 02:10-cv-07777 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2012),
ECF No. 214 (“As the Court has already ruled, those class members who did not suffer physical
damage to a proprietary interest (unless the claim falls into the commercial fisherman exception)
have no federal maritime claim (Doc. 3830, p. 38). Based on information and belief, the large
majority of class members will not have federal maritime claims and will have only OPA claims.”).
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These objectors asserted that separate class representatives “and
counsel” should have been appointed to represent class members with
and without federal maritime claims, within the Coastal Real Property
Damage subgroup, and more generally within the settlement class.145
Despite the material differences between their entitlement to punitive
damages, both subgroups (those with and without physical damages) get
the same RTP under the settlement, which Sturdivan Objectors
interpreted to mean that owners of physically damaged real property
were not paid for their punitive damages claims.146
In rejecting all of these objections, the trial court and, on appeal, the
Fifth Circuit, applied what is now a recognizable array of arguments for
limiting the impact of Amchem and Ortiz, such that the courts found no
conflicts that required subclassing.147 Those arguments are laid out in
section II.C., below. Before turning to them, it is helpful to lay out the
additional pieces of the sprawling class settlements the BP oil spill
litigation produced.
ii.

Medical Benefits (Personal Injury) Settlement

The MDL PSC that represented the economic loss settlement class
also negotiated the separate “medical benefits” (personal injury)
settlement, though it assigned a subset of its members to take the lead in
these discussions.148 The personal injury settlement identifies eleven
named representatives149 of a class of persons who worked as “Clean-Up
Workers” as defined in the Complaint (and settlement) or resided in
defined geographic zones within particular time periods, and, if a Zone
A resident, who developed a physical symptom or illness “that is
associated with exposure to oil/or dispersants or decontaminants.”150

145. Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 5, 32–33.
147. See infra section II.C.
148. Expert Report of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Medical Benefits Class
Settlement ¶ 76, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. August 13, 2012), ECF No. 7111-4
(“The medical benefits settlement was negotiated separately from the economic and property
damages settlement, and a different group of PSC attorneys led the negotiations.”).
149. Medical Class Action Complaint ¶ 5(a)–(k), Plaisance v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 2:12cv-00968 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Personal Injury Class Complaint].
150. Id. ¶ 84. More precisely, the Settlement Class is defined to include three categories of
members: (1) individuals who worked as cleanup workers at any time between April 20, 2010 and
April 16, 2012; (2) individuals who resided in Zone A (Gulf Coast beachfront areas) for some time
on each of at least sixty days between April 20, 2010 and September 30, 2010 (“Zone A Resident”),
and developed one or more Specified Physical Conditions between April 20, 2010 and September
30, 2010; and (3) individuals who resided in Zone B (Gulf Coast wetland areas) for some time on

10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/30/2017 1:01 PM

CLASS CONFLICTS

817

In exchange for a class release,151 the personal injury settlement
provides four main benefits to the class: a claims program for Specified
Physical Conditions, described below; a Back-End Litigation Option for
Later-Manifested Physical Conditions;152 a Periodic Medical
Consultation Program; and a Gulf Region Health Outreach Program. The
specified Physical Conditions claims program is a negotiated set of
matrices for Specified Medical Conditions. Benefits vary based on,
among other things: the reason for and source of exposure (e.g., as
cleanup worker or resident); geographic region (e.g., beachfront and
wetland “Zones”); whether the claimant was merely exposed or is
presently injured, and, if presently injured, whether the claimant has
experienced acute (short-term) or chronic (ongoing) medical conditions
after exposure to oil or chemical dispersants; and the type of proof.153
Eligible Specified Physical Conditions fall into a range of categories,
including vision; respiratory; ear, nose, and throat; skin;
neurophysiological/neurological/odor-related conditions; gastrointestinal
or stomach conditions; and, for cleanup workers only, heat-related
conditions. The Specified Physical Conditions Matrix is a 14-page chart
that shows proof requirements and payment amounts by disease,
worker/resident status, and geographic Zone.154 The chart also identifies
“enhancers” (e.g., overnight hospitalization) and states whether actual
hospital expenses are a prerequisite for recovery.155

each of at least sixty days between April 20, 2010, and December 31, 2010 (“Zone B Resident”).
Economic Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 133, at 5.
151. Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement, as Amended on May 1, 2012 at 103–
11, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012), ECF No. 6427-1 [hereinafter
Personal Injury Settlement Agreement].
152. Persons who develop a “Later-Manifested Physical Condition” are entitled to participate in a
“Back-End Litigation Option,” including a limited right to sue BP for specified diseases manifesting
after a particular date, subject to BP’s right to “mediate” the dispute, and without the ability to
pursue punitive damages. Order and Reasons [Granting Final Approval of the Medical Benefits
Class Action Settlement] at 16–17, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2013),
ECF No. 8127 [hereinafter Personal Injury Final Approval Order]. Importantly, this is not a backend opt out right, though it does serve a limitation on the scope of the release. The persons who
experience Later-Manifested Physical Conditions are still class members, and are subject to various
limitations, including limitations on elections of remedies, the issues to be litigated via discovery
and at trial and proof, punitive damages, and venue. Personal Injury Settlement Agreement, supra
note 151, at 57–58, 64, 66–69.
153. Personal Injury Final Approval Order, supra note 152, at 8.
154. Personal Injury Settlement Agreement, supra note 151, at Exhibit 8, ECF No. 6427-10. The
Zones are demarcated in Exhibits 9–10 to the settlement. See Personal Injury Settlement Agreement,
supra note 151, at Exhibits 9 and 10, ECF Nos. 6427-11 & 6427-12.
155. Personal Injury Final Approval Order, supra note 152, at Exhibit 8, ECF No. 6427-10.
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Again, given the obviousness and range of variables used to
discriminate among personal injury class members for settlement
purposes, arguments were predictably made in support of creating
multiple subclasses with separate counsel to ensure a degree of loyalty
when making allocation choices. For example, the medical benefits class
included both persons who were merely exposed to oil and dispersants
as well as persons who manifested physical injuries. The court opted to
forgo subclassing presently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs, citing
the declaration of Professor Coffee, who testified that “there are no
‘future claimants’—persons exposed to a toxic substance who have not
yet manifested any injury—who will receive any compensation for
future injuries under the Medical Benefits Settlement Agreement.”156
That testimony rested on Professor Coffee’s understanding that, even
though Zone B and Clean-Up Workers are by definition not required to
have an acute or chronic condition specified on the Specified Physical
Conditions Matrix, they are nevertheless “injured” for purposes of
general maritime law because the complaints allege they “inhaled fumes
or physically contacted oil or dispersants.”157 Put differently, the BP trial
court ignored the exposure-only versus presently-injured conflict in the
personal injury settlement by assuming that, as a formal legal matter, all
workers in a particular zone were not just exposed but also injured.
Formal niceties aside, exposure-only plaintiffs arguably had an interest
in negotiating a more liberal and generous Back End Litigation Option;
whereas the presently-injured plaintiffs were interested in relatively
greater compensation for their manifested injuries. Amchem is thus
directly analogous. Even so, it is possible to distinguish the degree of
conflict in Amchem and BP. The asbestos settlement did not have
anything like the BP settlement’s Back End Litigation Option, and
arguably undercompensated persons with later-manifesting injuries by
failing to account for inflation when calculating payouts.158 Then again,
the BP settlement’s Back End Litigation Option included features that
call its meaningfulness into question, e.g., the requirement that plaintiffs
elect between worker’s compensation and a suit against BP, and limits
on evidence (e.g., re BP’s gross negligence) and remedies (e.g., punitive
damages).159 Regardless of how well the settlement compensated
exposure-only personal injury claimants, the structural assurance of
156. Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. ¶ 52, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug.
10, 2012), ECF No. 7113-2 [hereinafter Coffee Personal Injury Declaration].
157. Id. ¶ 54.
158. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
159. See supra note 152.

10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/30/2017 1:01 PM

CLASS CONFLICTS

819

separate counsel was missing. Separate counsel may have negotiated the
same or better terms. We’ll never know.
Instead of creating multiple subclasses with separate counsel along
any of the fault lines pitting class members against each other for
settlement purposes, Judge Barbier certified just two settlement classes
against BP, and named the same lawyers to represent both. He granted
final approval to both the economic and personal injury class action
settlements with BP, dismissing objections regarding adequacy of
representation and intra-class conflicts, and was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit on appeal.160
b.

Competing Punitive Damage Classes with One Set of Counsel

In the economic settlement described above, BP assigned its claims
against non-settling defendants to the settlement class. To resolve those
and other claims, the MDL PSC negotiated two new class settlements,
one with Halliburton, the provider of the cement used at the original BP
drill site, in 2014,161 and another with Transocean, the owners of the
drilling rig, in 2015.162 These nearly identical settlements resolved two
categories of claims, those of the “Old Class” (the BP economic loss
class described above), to end litigation regarding BP’s Assigned
Claims, as well as those of a “New Class” of all persons with punitive
damages claims against Halliburton and Transocean, only a subset of
whom were members of the Old Class. The New Class was both
narrower and broader than the Old Class. It was broader because it
included “many claimants whose property suffered direct physical
damage from the explosion and oil spill, but who were excluded from
the Old Class. Among others, these include local governments . . . and

160. The Fifth Circuit affirmed final approval and rejected appeals asserting conflicts of interest,
repeating the trial court’s arguments. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 796 (5th Cir.
2014).
161. HESI Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement (Amended as of
November 13, 2014), In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2014), ECF No. 136461 [hereinafter Halliburton Settlement Agreement]. The settlement benefit is primarily a limited cash
payment of $1.028 billion to resolve both the New Class punitive damage claims and the Old Class
assigned claims. Id. at 18. Additionally, Halliburton agrees to pay a reasonable amount for common
benefit attorney’s fees and costs, up to a maximum of $99,950,000. Id. at 43.
162. Transocean’s Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement, In re Oil Spill,
No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 29, 2015), ECF No. 14644-1 [hereinafter Transocean Settlement
Agreement]. Transocean agreed to pay $211,750,000 to resolve both the Assigned Claims (from
BP) of the “Old Class” and the punitive damages claims of the “New Class” defined in the
agreement. Id. at 17–18. In addition, Transocean agrees to pay common benefit attorneys’ fees and
costs in the amount awarded by the court up to $25 million. Id. at 43.
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oil and gas interests.”163 It was narrower because it included only that
subset of Old Class members who could satisfy the “physical injury”
threshold of the Robins Dry Dock rule164 and thus were entitled to a
punitive damages award.165
The same lawyers served as “Old Class” and “New Class” counsel.166
The agreements they negotiated with Halliburton and Transocean
expressly pitted Old and New Class members against each other, in that
the capped settlement amounts had to be allocated between them. In lieu
of seeking appointment of separate counsel for each class, the
settlements relied on an alternative structural assurance of fairness—a
court-appointed Allocation Neutral167—to deal with the obvious
conflicts.168 The Allocation Neutral proposed allocation of 72.8% of the
settlements to the New Class and 27.2% to the Old Class, a
recommendation the trial court adopted.169

163. Id. at 19.
164. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
165. Transocean Settlement Agreement, supra note 162, at 18.
166. The “parties” to the agreements are listed as the PSC on behalf of the New Class defined in
the agreement and the DHEPDS Class Counsel, for the BP economic loss settlement class. See, e.g.,
Halliburton Settlement Agreement, supra note 161, at 4, 11. DHEPDS (i.e., BP economic loss
settlement) Class Counsel and the PSC acting for New Class to negotiate the settlement are the
same persons. They are listed by role rather than by name. To underscore the point, Roy and
Herman signed both as PSC Co-Liaison Counsel for New Class and as DHEPDS Settlement Class
Counsel for Old Class. Id. at 52. The Court gave credence to that formal way of separating counsel
and their roles, e.g., in its order appointing Wilkinson as the Allocation Neutral, which identified the
parties requesting appointment as “Plaintiffs Steering Committee (on behalf of the members of a
putative New Class)” and “DHEPDS Class Counsel (on behalf of the DHEPDS Class),” as if those
were distinct persons. See Order Appointing Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. as
Allocation Neutral at 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2015), ECF No.
15398 [hereinafter Order Appointing Wilkinson]. The same format is used in the Transocean
agreement to refer to the same lawyers serving in distinct roles. Transocean Settlement Agreement,
supra note 162, at 1–3.
167. The trial court appointed Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinsin, Jr. to serve as Allocation
Neutral. See Order Appointing Wilkinson, supra note 166.
168. Declaration of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to Class Certification and Fairness Issues in the
Proposed Halliburton and Transocean Settlements ¶ 32, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D.
La. Aug. 5, 2016), ECF No. 21423-1 (noting that Magistrate Judge Wilkinson established the
allocation between the two classes and that “[n]either Co-Liaison/Co-Lead/Class Counsel, the PSC,
nor any Class Counsel advocated for any particular allocation; it is my understanding that counsel
were silent and neutral on the issue to avoid any perceived conflict”). The settling parties similarly
attempted to address allocation conflicts within the Old and New Classes by delegating allocation
decisions to neutrals. Id. ¶¶ 68–72; see also PD Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 130, at 9
(describing appointment of neutral to devise a distribution plan for New Class members).
169. PD Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 130, at 9; In re Oil Spill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165622, at *16 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2015).

10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/30/2017 1:01 PM

CLASS CONFLICTS

821

If Literary Works’s interpretation of Amchem and Ortiz had traction
outside the Second Circuit, this would be a recipe for failure of the class
settlement. Instead, Judge Barbier granted final approval of the punitive
damage settlements.170 His Order and Reasons addressed adequacy of
representation in only a summary way, concluding that “[t]his case
suffers from none of the problems identified in Amchem,” in part
because the class members were “protected by a specific, detailed, and
objective framework that was developed and promulgated publicly by
the Claims Administrator” and because “differences within the
framework are rationally related to the relative strengths and merits of
similarly situated claimants.”171
2.

The NFL Concussion Injury Litigation

Unlike the BP settlements, which involved zero subclassing with
separate counsel, the NFL litigation is an example of minimalist and pro
forma use of subclassing. It falls in that cluster of cases where courts
subclass only with regard to futures or other similarly limited categories
of claims, without guaranteeing truly separate and independent
representation, either because of the timing of the subclassing or because
subclass counsel are pulled from a pool of existing common benefit
counsel whose fees are not truly tethered to the fortunes of any one
subclass.
In July 2011, seventy-three former professional football players sued
the NFL and a manufacturer of helmets, asserting as to the NFL that it
“failed to take reasonable actions to protect them from the chronic risks
of head injuries in football.”172 Thousands of additional claims were
filed in over 300 lawsuits transferred and consolidated by the Judicial
Panel to Judge Anita Brody in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.173
Judge Brody quickly appointed a leadership team of plaintiffs’ counsel
to handle pretrial activity, including settlement.174

170. See Final Order and Judgment Granting Approval of HESI and Transocean Punitive
Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreements at 2–4, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179
(E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017), ECF No. 22253.
171. Order and Reasons [Granting Final Approval of the HESI and Transocean Punitive Damages
and Assigned Claims Class Action Settlements] at 20–21, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:20-md-02179 (E.D.
La. Feb. 15, 2017), ECF No. 22252 [hereinafter PD Final Approval Order and Reasons].
172. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
173. Transfer Order at 2, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012), ECF No. 1.
174. Case Management Order No. 2, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury
Litig., Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2012), ECF No. 64 (appointing counsel);
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In July 2013, while the NFL’s motion to dismiss was pending, Judge
Brody ordered the parties to mediate and appointed a mediator.175 Within
a few months, the parties reached an agreement covering 20,000 retired
players and providing a $765 million fund to pay for medical
examinations and to compensate injured players.176 Concerned that the
capped fund might be insufficient, Judge Brody denied the motion for
preliminary approval.177 She appointed a Special Master to help the
parties make financial forecasts, and five months later the parties
reached a revised settlement providing for uncapped settlement
payments pursuant to a settlement grid.178
From the outset, it was obvious that any settlement would have to
distinguish among class members based on a range of factors, including
type of illness.179 The final NFL settlement does so through its central
feature, an uncapped Monetary Award Fund overseen by a claims
administrator that provides compensation for Retired Players who
submit proof of Qualifying Diagnoses.180 The settlement recognizes only
six such diagnoses, from varying levels of neurological impairment to
Alzheimer’s Disease, Parkinson’s Disease, ALS, and death with chronic
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE).181 The settlement releases claims
without compensation for many of the symptoms of CTE, such as

Case Management Order No. 3, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., Case
No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012), ECF No. 72 (appointing additional counsel).
175. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 422; Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(noting the appointment of retired United States District Court Judge Layn Phillips as mediator).
176. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 422.
177. In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2014);
Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 364.
178. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 423.
179. Other factors that were used to distinguish class members in the settlement, and that were
evident as possible sources of allocation conflicts at the front end, included age, length of service in
the NFL, and the date on which a player died. See Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 367 (“A Retired Player’s
Monetary Award is subject to a series of incremental offsets. The older a Retired Player is at the
time he receives a Qualifying Diagnosis, the smaller his award will be.”); (“[A]ny eligible
Representative Claimant of a deceased Retired Player who died prior to January 1, 2006 will receive
a Monetary Award only if he can show that his wrongful death or survival claim would not be
barred by the statute of limitations . . . .”). Objections made to the settlement on the merits with
regard to these factors could have been pitched as adequacy of representation objections, but were
instead mostly made and treated as objections regarding the adequacy of the settlement. See, e.g., id.
at 407–08 (dismissing objections to the age offset).
180. Id. at 365. The other two key features of the settlement are a $75 million Baseline
Assessment Program that provides eligible players with free baseline assessment exams of their
neurological functioning, and a $10 million educational program. Id. at 365–66.
181. Id. at 367.
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changes in mood, including depression.182 Moreover, the settlement
compensates CTE death claims only for persons who died prior to the
final fairness hearing.183 These distinctions represent tradeoffs made by
counsel for the class when deciding how to structure settlement
payments.
Though one can imagine subclassing on multiple dimensions,184 the
trial court certified only two subclasses, for claimants with and without a
Qualifying Diagnosis. Counsel selected the representatives for each
class: Shawn Wooden for other retired players with no Qualifying
Diagnosis (i.e., no injury), whose primary interest was in a medical
examination, and Kevin Turner for presently-injured retired players
whose primary interest was in compensation.185
The trial court appointed separate counsel for each subclass to
participate in the negotiations, but they were appointed only after
negotiations by all counsel had begun.186 The significance of the timing
of the appointment of subclass counsel becomes clear when one reviews
the timeline of negotiations: the formal mediation that led to the initial
class settlement lasted twelve days,187 and the time period between the
182. Id. at 397.
183. Id. On this last score, the trial court found that the class members were all equally at risk of
CTE and that the class representative for persons who had not yet manifested a qualifying injury
was, or at least alleged himself to be, one such person. Id.
184. Public Citizen, a class action watchdog group, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=369
[https://perma.cc/BUS4-8ZA6], put it succinctly:
The flaw in the class certification can be stated succinctly: A small group of attorneys,
eventually designated as representing two named class representatives, devised a benefits plan
and a grid for determining settlement benefits that (1) includes only five disease categories
(plus death with CTE prior to settlement approval), (2) contains significant offsets to
settlement benefits based on age at time of diagnosis and eligible years played in the NFL, and
(3) excludes from payment a large percentage of the class who have concussion-related
conditions that are alleged in the class complaint. The attorneys for the class did not, and could
not, properly represent the wide range of circumstances of the class as a whole in this
settlement.
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Public Citizen, Inc., in Support of Appellants Seeking Reversal at 2, In re
NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., Case 15-2230 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2015), ECF No.
003112056130. Similar objections were made by objectors at the trial court level and on appeal.
See, e.g., Objection of Craig Heimburger and Dawn Heimburger at 8, In re NFL Players’
Concussion Injury Litig., Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF No. 6230
(“Two settlement classes are not enough for a fact-pattern this complex (and even if it were, the
separate representation is questionable when each of the attorneys for each of the subclasses
separately represented individual clients in the other subclass and did not ever disclose that
conflict.)”).
185. In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 427–28 (3d Cir. 2016); Turner,
307 F.R.D. at 372.
186. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 429 (“When class counsel and the NFL began mediation,
there was only one proposed class of all retired players.”).
187. Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 363.
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commencement of those negotiations and the reaching of a deal was
only two months.188 So appointment of subclass counsel in that window
left little room for counsel whose loyalty had previously been to all
plaintiffs as a whole to adjust to a new, more tailored role.
Moreover, subclass counsel were appointed from the group of
common benefit counsel who had already been representing all plaintiffs
in the MDL and were not only counsel for the subclasses, but were
instead common benefit counsel for all MDL plaintiffs as well as class
counsel for all class members who also happened to have special
responsibility for advancing subclass members’ interests.189 They did not
even have responsibility for negotiating a settlement of subclass
members’ claims or issues and instead just “played an active role” in the
mediation process.190 In the NFL concussion injury litigation, subclass
counsel’s fortunes do not clearly rise or fall with those of the class
members; instead, as class counsel for all class members, their fees
could arguably be determined based on the value of the settlement to
class members as a whole.
Objectors unsuccessfully challenged the trial court’s limited use of
subclassing, and, as to the two subclasses it created, the timing of the
appointment of subclass counsel and their selection from among existing
MDL common benefit counsel.191 Objectors relied on Amchem and
Ortiz, on Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation requirement, and on
188. Id. at 364.
189. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 429 (“[C]lass counsel designated lawyers from the Steering
Committee to serve as subclass counsel.”); Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 425 (“Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(g), the Court confirms the appointment of Christopher A. Seeger, Sol Weiss,
Steven C. Marks, Gene Locks, Arnold Levin, and Dianne M. Nast as Class Counsel. In addition the
Court confirms the appointment of Christopher A. Seeger and Sol Weiss as Co-Lead Class Counsel,
and confirms the appointments of Arnold Levin and Dianne M. Nast as Subclass Counsel for
Subclasses 1 and 2, respectively.”).
190. See Declaration of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Class Settlement in the
National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation ¶ 31, In re Nat’l Football League
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No.
6423-9 [hereinafter Klonoff NFL Declaration] (“[A]lthough co-lead class counsel took the lead on
negotiating the settlement, counsel for the two subclasses ‘played an active role in the mediation
process,’” citing Declaration of Co-Lead Class Counsel Christopher A. Seeger in Support of Final
Approval of Settlement and Certification of Class and Subclasses ¶ 27, In re Nat’l Football League
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No.
6423-3)); id. ¶ 43 (“Subclass Counsel each performed their own due diligence and independently
assured themselves that the deal was fair and satisfied the needs of their respective Subclass
members and Due Process.”).
191. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 42930 (noting, too, that for the first time on appeal,
objectors also challenged the adequacy of representation where Arnold Levin, counsel for the noinjury subclass, represented individual plaintiffs who potentially had already experienced qualifying
injuries).
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Rule 23(g), added by rule amendment in 2003 to separate out the criteria
for appointing class counsel.192 A faithful application of Amchem and
Ortiz would have led to an outcome that differed on at least two
dimensions. First, at a minimum, the separate subclasses would have had
separate counsel.193 Second, they would have been named at a point
when subclass counsel could have assured that the settlement process
was structurally fair, i.e., before settlement negotiations progressed.194
Nevertheless, Judge Brody granted final approval to the settlement. The
Third Circuit affirmed the settlement class certification and final
approval order, and the Supreme Court denied petitions for writ of
certiorari.195
C.

Lower Court Attack Vectors

How did we get from Amchem to the BP and NFL class settlements?
The range and intensity of conflicts among persons with different
circumstances and claim values suggest that had the BP and NFL
settlement class certification orders been before the Supreme Court in
the late 1990s, the Court would have required subclassing with separate
counsel on multiple dimensions to provide the necessary structural
assurance of fair representation by aligning the interests of subclass
counsel and the class members, even if that meant upending the
settlements in those cases and prolonging the agony of litigation. The
trial and circuit courts in the BP and NFL matters avoided that outcome
by following attack vectors defined by the lower federal courts since the
late 1990s.
1.

Limiting Amchem and Ortiz to a Narrow Reading of Their Facts

Amchem and Ortiz involved conflicts among class members regarding
settlement design. As noted, one conflict the Court highlighted was that
between presently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs; but the Court
also gave examples of how the presence within a class of diverse claims
of varying strength and value can force counsel to make impermissible
tradeoffs among class members. In Amchem, the Court gave the example
of persons with loss of consortium claims, which were released but not
192. Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 373 n.27.
193. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
194. Id.
195. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 44748. The Supreme Court denied two writ petitions on the
same day. See Gilchrist v. NFL, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016); Armstrong v. NFL, __ U.S. __,
137 S. Ct. 607 (2016).
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compensated under the settlement.196 In Ortiz, the key example was the
claims of persons whose injuries occurred before and after 1959, the
end-date of availability of an insurance policy that potentially covered
and thus impacted the value of claims.197 The settlement treated all
claimants equally, without regard to date of injury, which troubled the
Court.198
Nevertheless, a number of courts have suggested that Amchem and
Ortiz apply less forcefully outside the setting of mass torts inflicting
latent personal injuries that create futures problems, writing as if the
other categories of conflicts the Court also deemed problematic did not
exist.199 This appears to be what the Third Circuit meant when, in
Community Bank,200 it recently held that Amchem and Ortiz have to be
applied cautiously because of their “atypical circumstances.”201 In the
BP litigation, Judge Barbier’s lead argument in support of his finding of
“no conflicts of interest among the class”202 was that there was
ostensibly no futures problem in BP, implying that Amchem’s holding
was somehow uniquely relevant to that category of conflict. Implicitly,
196. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
197. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 857 (1999).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 638 (S.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 473 Fed.
App’x 716 (9th Cir. 2012) (“This case does not involve contested insurance funds or present and
future claimants.”); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No: 3:08-MD01998, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119870, at *22 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (“[U]nlike an asbestos
mass tort action where unknown plaintiffs may develop symptoms decades later, this action
involves an objectively identifiable class.”); In re Texas Prison Litig., 191 F.R.D. 164, 179 (W.D.
Mo. 1999) (“The Court is aware that the U.S. Supreme Court has recently expressed concern about
the use of class actions to resolve mass tort claims. The Supreme Court’s two overarching concerns
have been whether the class is adequately represented and whether the class is sufficiently cohesive
to warrant adjudication by representation . . . . Unlike some of the recent mass tort class actions
which have been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, this class action does not involve
unpredictable damages that may arise in the future, or involve claimants that are yet unborn.”);
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Leonard, 125 S.W.3d 55, 67 (Tex. App. 2003) (“The problems which led to a
conflict in the asbestos cases were unique to personal injury cases.”). Commentators, too, have
emphasized the practical importance in Amchem of the disparate treatment of inventory clients and
class members, all of whom had only unfiled claims, though the Court’s holding did not expressly
turn on that distinction. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 YALE L.J. 2545, 2547–48 (1998).
200. In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2015).
201. Id. at 393 (quoting Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha, Local 385 v. Zalewski, 678 F.3d 640,
646–47 (8th Cir. 2012)).
202. Economic Final Approval Order and Reasons, supra note 132, at 31; see also PD Final
Approval Order and Reasons, supra note 171, at 20 (“This case suffers from none of the problems
identified in Amchem, where the Court noted a potential intraclass conflict, in the context of a
settlement with an overall cap, between individuals who had already been injured by asbestos and
those who had only been exposed to it.”).
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Judge Brody in the NFL case—supported by expert testimony from
Professor Klonoff203—adopted a similar approach when picking out the
futures problem as being somehow singularly worthy of attention.
Similarly, lower courts have read the intensity of the concern with
conflicts in Amchem and Ortiz as flowing from the fact that litigation
was commenced at the same time a class settlement was presented.204
For example, in Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co.,205 the Eighth Circuit argued
that Amchem and Ortiz “each involved a situation in which the parties
agreed upon a class definition and a settlement before formally initiating
litigation, and then presented the district court with the complaint,
proposed class, and proposed settlement.”206 This characterization of
Amchem and Ortiz is technically true, but glosses over the fact that
settlements in those cases followed years of non-class litigation.207 Yet
in rejecting objections to a class settlement focused on adequacy of
representation, the Eighth Circuit in Petrovic found that “heightened”
concern for conflicts was not warranted due to the length of time the
case had been litigated before it was settled.208
2.

Narrowly Defining “Fundamental” Conflicts to Exclude the Most
Common Allocation Conflicts

Allocation conflicts necessitating subclassing included, in Amchem,
conflicts among class members with categories of claims of varying
settlement value,209 and in Ortiz, claims of varying strength.210
Nevertheless, the trial courts in the BP and NFL litigations found that
differences in claim strength or value were not sufficiently
“fundamental” to warrant subclassing.211
203. See Klonoff NFL Declaration, supra note 190, ¶ 34. (describing the Amchem and Ortiz as if
the only relevant conflicts were between exposure-only and presently-injured plaintiffs, i.e., the
futures problem).
204. Charron v. Wiener, 731 F.3d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussed supra note 100 and
accompanying text); Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 (8th Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing Amchem and Ortiz because the settlement in the Petrovic case followed years of
litigation).
205. 200 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 1145–46.
207. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821–24 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 600–02 (1997).
208. Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1145.
209. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
210. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857.
211. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 34 (finding no “fundamental” conflicts,
and that “[i]t’s perfectly fair and reasonable, and indeed common and accepted, for settlement
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Some lower federal courts have gone so far as to categorically define
“fundamental” conflicts as excluding such allocation conflicts. The
Third Circuit has been at the vanguard of this approach to limiting
Amchem and Ortiz. In In re Pet Food Products Liability Litigation,212 the
Third Circuit rejected objections to adequacy of representation due to
failure to subclass in a settlement of claims against manufacturers of
adulterated dog food. The settlement distinguished among class
members with varying claims and injuries and assigned different values
to such claims in recognition of their relative strength. The court held
that “differences in settlement value do not, without more, demonstrate
conflicting or antagonistic interests within the class”213 and that “alleged
differences in the strength of the various claims asserted in this class
action do not, by themselves, demonstrate conflicting or antagonistic
interests within the class that would require subclasses.”214 Other circuits
have held similarly.215
3.

Invoking the Specter of “Balkanization” and “Holdouts”

Lower federal courts have consistently used metaphors of geopolitical
chaos and blackmail to justify avoiding or minimizing subclassing.
These metaphors capture two categories of anxiety. First, the fear is that
any amount of subclassing with separate counsel will cause conflicts that
would otherwise have lain mostly dormant to bubble to surface through
the adversarial process, creating a chain reaction of endless separate
representation, a process courts and commentators label
benefits to turn on strength of class members’ claims”); Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 376 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (narrowly defining “fundamental” conflicts as existing “where some [class] members
claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that benefitted other members of the class”).
212. 629 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2010).
213. Id. at 346, 348 (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“[E]ven assuming objectors’ characterization of the Purchase Claims as ‘strong’ and Injury Claims
as ‘weak’ carries some validity, objectors fail to articulate how differences in the relative strength of
the different claims would lead to conflicts of interest in class representation . . . . It appears to us
objectors’ focus on the relative strength of the claims, like their focus on the disparity of the
allocation, is more appropriately addressed as a Rule 23(e) adequacy of allocation question, rather
than a Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation question.”); see also Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1146–48
(rejecting need for subclasses because almost every settlement involves claims of varying value); In
re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07-cv-5944 JST, 2016 WL 721680, at *15 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (“The mere fact that ‘relief varie[s] among the different groups of class members
[does] not demonstrate . . . conflicting or antagonistic interests within the class’ or adequacy of
representation issues.” (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 272)).
214. In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 347 (3d Cir. 2010).
215. See, e.g., Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1146 (finding conflicts regarding allocation based on varying
claim strength and value to be insufficiently “stark” to require subclassing).
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“Balkanization.” Second, the fear is that once such subclasses are
formed, their distinct counsel will hold out for a greater share of
settlement proceeds than is otherwise due to them, making settlement
unlikely or possible only on unfair terms.
a.

Balkanization

“Balkanization” is a metaphor for the descent into endless
fragmentation. Applied to aggregate litigation, the fear is that
segmentation could convert an otherwise cohesive group into “feuding
enclaves”216 and that segmentation builds on itself, so that splitting at
one crack in the aggregate ineluctably causes the whole thing to crumble
into countless pieces. As a metaphor, it is used across jurisdictions
within the federal system as a shorthanded for a more fulsome
argument.217 It is worth unpacking: central to the metaphor’s power is
the notion that there is no logical stopping point between any
segmentation of representation of the aggregate and complete chaos. It
assumes that all splits in the aggregate are equal, such that if any one
warrants segmentation, they all must.
Relying on procedural experts’ invocation of the specter of
Balkanization,218 Judge Barbier in BP invoked the Balkanization
metaphor when finding that “if subclasses were entertained, there would
be no principled basis for limiting the number of subclasses.”219
Similarly, in the NFL concussion personal injury litigation, Judge Brody
216. Coffee, supra note 30, at 374–75.
217. See, e.g., Williams v. Rohm & Haas Pension Plan, 685 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[O]ther class members argued that separate subclasses should be created to account for potentially
different outcomes based on the statute of limitations. ‘[I]f subclassing is required for each material
legal or economic difference that distinguishes class members, the Balkanization of the class action
is threatened.’” (quoting Coffee, supra note 30)); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 629 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing threat
of “Balkanization” as a justification for supporting the trial court’s refusal to subclass); In re
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Coffee, supra note 30).
218. See Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. ¶¶ 29, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La.
Aug. 10, 2012), ECF No. 7110-3 [hereinafter Coffee Economic Declaration]; Supplemental
Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 98, ¶ 19, ECF No. 7726–4 (asserting that objectors’
logic “could require an endless number of subclasses”); Declaration of Samuel Issacharoff ¶ 11, In
re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012) (“[T]he settlement process itself would
unravel if discussions were held among a growing number of subgroups, which would then likely
beget further subgroups by the same logic.”); Supplemental Declaration of Geoffrey P. Miller ¶ 19,
In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2012) (“Virtually every class action involves
class members who are somewhat differently situated in a myriad of discrete ways. If sub-classing
and separate representation were required for all such interests, class action litigation would be all
but impossible.”).
219. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 35–36.
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rejected arguments regarding the need for separate counsel for each
subclass by arguing that “[i]f subclassing is required for each material
legal or economic difference that distinguishes class members, the
Balkanization of the class is threatened.”220 Judge Brody’s fears were
also supported by expert testimony, in that case from Professor Klonoff,
who wrote:
If the subclassing process includes the many alleged injuries
caused by concussions outlined by the Brain Injury experts, and
if each of those injury categories is then subdivided based on
age, length of eligible service, and dollar values, the required
number of subclasses could easily exceed 50. Neither Amchem
nor any other case requires the creation of never-ending
numbers of subclasses.221
To evaluate the correctness of the application of the Balkanization
metaphor in these particular cases, we first have to ask, in general,
whether there is any logical stopping point in any case between, at one
extreme, recognizing no conflict as sufficient to warrant segmentation of
an administrative or class aggregate, and, at the other, seeing every
conflict as requiring segmentation. To answer, it helps to match the
theory and doctrine of class conflicts sketched in section I.A., above, to
the practical aspects of settling a mass tort. As noted, conflicts law
assesses the risks of disloyalty in light of the costs of deeming a conflict
impermissible.222
The logic of settlement lends itself to the balancing tests applied in
the case law, demonstrating the capacity of counsel and trial courts to
identify the fissures that warrant subclassing. Settling parties naturally
map the underlying litigation onto grids, which are used by lawyers and
MDL judges when tackling pleading, motion practice, discovery, and
settlement. Grids take shape long before they are embedded in
settlements. In BP, the broad outlines of the grids later used to settle the
proceedings were evident at least as of the filing of master pleadings. 223
Similarly, the parties in the NFL concussion injury litigation quickly
coalesced around a settlement grid structured on predictable variables

220. Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 404 F.3d at 202 (quoting Coffee, supra note 30, at 398)).
221. Klonoff NFL Declaration, supra note 190, ¶¶ 39, 43 (“Again, once one goes down the road
of subclassing beyond the two existing subclasses (presently diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis
and not presently diagnosed), it is hard to argue against additional subclasses based on player size,
position played, and other categories urged by objectors.”).
222. See supra notes 7678 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 125; infra note 245 and accompanying text.
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such as length of play, age, and type of disease.224 Other mass torts have
resolved on similar lines.225
Putting together theory, doctrine, and practice yields a clear
framework for preventing Balkanization. Trial courts may assess the
fault lines within the aggregate that present the greatest risk, at greatest
cost to affected subgroups, of giving rise to investment or allocation
conflicts, and can create a limited number of subclasses along those
lines. The “right” number of subclasses will depend on the facts of each
case. The point is that the choice is not between zero and an infinite
number, as the Balkanization metaphor suggests. Instead, subclasses can
be delineated in a contained way using the kinds of balancing tests
applied to grid frameworks that naturally arise in mass torts. We have
already seen one example descried above—Literary Works.
The “other” BP MDL involving financial misconduct claims provides
additional support. That litigation is an example of segmentation of an
administrative aggregate prior to any certification determination, which
the rules enable, e.g., via Rule 23(g), which permits appointment of
“interim” class counsel.226 MDL No. 2179, to which the economic loss,
property and personal injury claims were transferred, and which is the
subject of the mass tort case study described in Part II, above, was one of
two BP MDLs created after the spill. The second—MDL No. 2185—is
the proceeding to which the Judicial Panel sent all securities fraud,
derivative, and ERISA litigation against BP prosecuted in the wake of
the spill.227 That MDL was assigned to Judge Keith P. Ellison in the
Southern District of Texas.228 Unlike Judge Barbier, who concentrated

224. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
225. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 223 (2007) (“Like
workers’ compensation laws in the early twentieth century, peace arrangements for mass torts use
grids to match medical conditions with compensation payouts in a systematic manner.”).
226. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3).
227. Transfer Order at 2–3, In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10,
2010), ECF No. 1 (explaining why MDL No. 2185 would be separate from MDL No. 2179, the
Panel noted that the “true factual focuses of these two dockets are vastly different. Plaintiffs in
MDL No. 2179 will likely focus on the incident itself, the respective fault, if any, of the three or
four primary actors, and the incident’s economic and other after effects. In the securities actions,
discovery will likely focus on BP alone, its safety record over at least the past five years, and, in
particular, the alleged duty of BP officials to recognize and disclose the likelihood that a calamity
such as this might occur. Thus, the typical benefits of common discovery would likely be few”);
Order, In re BP Sec., Derivative & Emp’t Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2010), ECF No. 58 (denying Transfer in MDL No. 2189, Transferring the
Subject Actions to MDL No. 2185, and adding ERISA cases to MDL No. 2185).
228. Transfer Order at 2–3, In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10,
2010), ECF No. 1.
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responsibility for economic loss, property damage, and personal injury
claims in one undifferentiated group of plaintiffs’ attorneys, Judge
Ellison split MDL No. 2185 into three consolidated proceedings within
the MDL, each with its own distinct set of common benefit counsel, for
securities, derivative, and ERISA claims, respectively. 229 Judge Ellison
divided MDL No. 2185 that way even though it meant that there would
be some overlap in the discovery and other pretrial activity in those
cases.
Within the securities fraud consolidated proceedings in MDL No.
2185, Judge Ellison also appointed counsel for a subclass in the early
stages of the suit, choosing a single fracture in that case, which he saw as
sufficiently significant to warrant segmentation. As of the time of his
order appointing class counsel, there were seven class actions proposing
classes of “purchasers of American Depository Receipts (‘ADRs’) and
ordinary shares of BP during various time periods between 2005 and
2010.”230 The subclass was created to account for the differences in the
time periods on which the lead and subclass lead plaintiffs focused.231
Armed with an understanding regarding how courts may selectively
segment aggregates to manage conflicts in general, we can now critically
examine Judge Barbier’s and Judge Brody’s suggestions that they were
unable to do so in the BP oil spill and NFL concussion injury litigations
in particular. Judge Barbier’s own case management orders suggest that
he did in fact acknowledge discreet fault lines within the MDL aggregate
as worthy of particular distinction and segmentation. He divided the
proceedings between, on the one hand, economic loss and property
claims and, on the other, personal injury claims, both by assigning
separate pleading bundles to them at the outset and by certifying
separate settlement classes for them at the back end, with separate

229. Amended Order, In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2010),
ECF No. 74 (recognizing separate consolidated proceedings within the MDL).
230. Memorandum and Order at 2, In re BP, P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-02185 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 28, 2010), ECF No. 79 (consolidating the securities fraud cases and appointing lead plaintiffs
and their counsel for the class and subclass).
231. Id. at 11–12 (“While it is by no means certain that such conflicts [between the lead and
Ludlow plaintiffs over the time periods on which they focused] would prevent New York & Ohio
from adequately representing the class, the Court finds it particularly important at this early stage of
the case to avoid prejudicing the claims of absent class members through the appointment of a lead
plaintiff who cannot fully and fairly represent them. Because New York & Ohio’s losses are
concentrated outside the Ludlow Period, and because that concentration leads New York & Ohio to
present different legal theories than other plaintiffs, they have not made a preliminary showing of
typicality and adequacy. Therefore, New York & Ohio are not entitled to a presumption that they
are the most adequate lead plaintiffs.”).
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representative plaintiffs.232 Similarly, in the NFL litigation, Judge Brody
was able to contain subclassing to two groups, those with and without
Qualifying Diagnoses, without causing conflicts to multiply endlessly,
and could have similarly drawn the line at a higher number without
losing control.233
The distortion at the heart of the Balkanization metaphor is that
fragmentation is somehow something that happens to a litigation, as if
the judge is powerless to control it. Trial courts in the BP oil spill and
NFL concussion injury litigations adopted this position. But in fact,
Literary Works and the “other” BP litigations reveal that the opposite is
true.234 Trial court judges can assess the costs and benefits of carving
classes at obvious joints to create a level of competition that harnesses
some of the energy of competition without igniting a chain reaction of
endless fragmentation.
b.

Holdouts

A related source of resistance to subclassing with separate counsel is
the fear that counsel whose fees are tied to subgroup outcomes will
engage in extortion to increase their subgroup’s share and thus their
expected attorney’s fees.235 To put the fear in some context, it should be
noted that all settlement is a form of extortion. The plaintiff threatens
continued litigation and a possible judgment if the defendant refuses to
settle on terms the plaintiff finds acceptable. Extortion is a two-way
street, in that defendant can threaten high litigation costs and the
possibility of extinguishing that claim if plaintiff fails to agree to what
the defendant offers. In that light, extortion by subclasses is just another
way of describing negotiation of their interests.
The real fear is of opportunistic holdouts, i.e., those who are offered a
“reasonable” amount for a claim, but hold out for more, not seeking just
full claim value but instead seeking to capture a disproportionate share
of any settlement pie in exchange for discontinuing their obstruction of a
global peace. Logically, the more an aggregate is segmented, the more
persons there are who have the power to hold any settlement hostage.

232. See supra section II.B.1.a.
233. See supra section II.B.1.b.
234. See supra notes 8089, 22732 and accompanying text.
235. See generally Coffee, supra note 30, at 435–36 (“[T]he more subclasses that are required,
the greater the danger that one subclass will hold out.”); John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class
Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 655 (1987) (“[I]f any subclass can prevent the
settlement’s overall approval, the prospect for extortion is high.”).
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There is truth to the holdout argument to this extent: settling parties
would naturally prefer to have the counsel appointed to represent each
subset of the aggregate on board before concluding a global settlement.
However, counsel for subgroups do not have an actual veto power over
the settlement of those claims in either the class or the non-class setting.
If Rule 23 is used as the vehicle for providing closure in a global
settlement, a subset of counsel may bring a proposed class settlement to
the court, even over the objection of dissenting plaintiffs or counsel.236
Objections by counsel appointed to do common benefit work and to
serve as interim class counsel for a subgroup may cause friction at the
time of a global settlement. But such objections by themselves cannot
prevent a global settlement. The power to hold out is thus limited.
4.

The Mystique of Uncapped Settlement Funds

Trial courts in the BP237 and NFL238 litigations argued that because
the funds were (mostly) uncapped, there were no conflicts of interest.
Supported by reports and affidavits from legal scholars,239 Judge Barbier
found that the uncapped nature of the funds (other than the Seafood
Compensation Program, which was capped) meant that settling parties
did not need to, and thus did not, make tradeoffs among claimants.240
The assumption was that if BP was willing to pay all claims pursuant to
the negotiated matrices, then there was no tension among class members,
because each would get whatever he deserved. Similarly, Judge Brody
held that the uncapped, inflation-adjusted nature of the fund in the NFL

236. See, e.g., In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984) (subset of
plaintiffs’ counsel unsuccessfully represented objecting plaintiffs). See generally MANUAL, supra
note 1, at § 21.642.
237. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 31 (“There are no conflicts of interest
among the class.”).
238. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 432 (3d Cir. 2016).
239. Professors John C. Coffee, Jr., Samuel Issacharoff, Robert Klonoff, and Geoffrey Miller
submitted reports or affidavits in support of the BP settlements. Coffee, Issacharoff and Klonoff
opined that the uncapped nature of the settlement funds for programs other than seafood, and the
high ceiling on the SCP fund, meant that there were no conflicts among settlement class members.
See, e.g., Coffee Economic Declaration, supra note 218, ¶¶ 8, 23–24; Declaration of Samuel
Issacharoff ¶ 14, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012), ECF No. 7101-6;
Expert Report of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages
Class Settlement ¶¶ 31, 36, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012), ECF No.
7101-5 (claimants were “not competing for limited dollars”).
240. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 3132 (“[M]ost importantly, this
Settlement does not involve a limited fund. . . . [T]he claims frameworks offering generally
uncapped compensation ensure that a benefit paid to one member of the class will in no way reduce
or interfere with a benefit obtained by another member.”).
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settlement was a “structural” protection that lessened concerns regarding
conflicts.241
One can see why the distinction between capped and uncapped,
claims-made settlements is illusory by looking at the BP litigation. BP
viewed its liability in the aggregate, as a total estimated dollar figure.
When negotiating the settlement matrices, BP undoubtedly had some
target figure in mind as the price it was willing to pay to secure legal
closure. It could have simply negotiated a settlement for that figure,
placing the risk on plaintiffs that the amount was too low to satisfy all
claims. Indeed, BP took exactly that approach when negotiating the
Seafood Compensation Program.242 As to other claim categories, BP
elected to take an alternative path, reaching the same figure it was
willing to pay for legal peace, but instead by negotiating grids with fixed
eligibility, proof requirements, and awards, adjusting those variables to
reach an estimated global target payout.243 That approach placed the risk
on BP that claims and claims payments would exceed its estimated total
liability. BP was likely willing to take the risk in this case because it had
access to substantial claims data from two sources, the GCCF it
established pursuant to its obligations to pay economic loss and property
damage claims,244 and, with regard to the personal injury claims
discussed in the next section, from a Medical Encounters Database
maintained in real time to track worker complaints during the cleanup
process.245
Because, as noted, the BP Seafood Compensation Program was a
capped fund, the matrices that constitute it even more obviously
represent negotiated allocations among competing claimants. Judge
Barbier held that the amount of the $2.3 billion SCP fund was
sufficiently high that tradeoffs among class members did not need to be
made within it,246 a variation of the uncapped fund argument addressed
above. Even if there was a windfall in the fund, however, its allocation
among persons with competing claims to it would categorically put those
persons in tension with each other.

241. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 432; Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 376–77 (E.D. Pa.
2015).
242. See Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 78.
243. See supra note 136.
244. See supra note 125.
245. Coffee Personal Injury Declaration, supra note 156, ¶¶ 42–51 (describing Medical
Encounters Database).
246. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 32–33.
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Alternative Structural Assurances of Fairness

Courts often point to the participation of court-appointed neutrals in
settlement negotiations as an alternative structural assurance of fairness
that obviates the need for subclassing, though typically without
addressing concern regarding information asymmetries between counsel
and neutrals that led the Second Circuit to reject that equation in Literary
Works.247 Judge Barbier made a similar argument in the BP case,
asserting that no conflicts existed in part because “Magistrate Judge
Shushan’s involvement further ensured structural integrity during the
negotiations.”248 In the NFL concussion injury litigation, after denying
the parties’ motion for preliminary approval of a settlement that resulted
from court-supervised mediation, the trial court directed the parties to
share expert actuarial information with Special Master Perry Golkin, an
expert in finance. Special Master Golkin also supervised discussion
designed to address the trial court’s concern that the initial capped
settlement amount might be insufficient. The court found that the
presence of a mediator and special master in the negotiation process
provided assurance of fairness.249
In BP, Judge Barbier found another way around a strict read of
Amchem by attempting to equate as alternative structural assurances of
fairness on the one hand, Amchem’s attorney-fee-based approach to
interest alignment and, on the other, the representativeness and
inclusiveness of the steering committee.250 Appointing a representative
and inclusive steering committee is a best practice. The MANUAL
proposes diversity within the steering committee.251 Professor Burch
proposes “encouraging input and dissent”252 from non-repeat players and
non-lead lawyers and appointment of steering committees that reflect the
diversity among the members of the aggregate.253 These suggestions are
247. See Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1324 n.25 (11th Cir. 2012) (“We are not the first
court to suggest that Amchem and Ortiz impose a requirement of adequate structural assurances, as
opposed to a per se requirement of formally designated subclasses.”); 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7.31, at 160 (5th ed. 2013) (citing Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d
1241, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004)).
248. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 33.
249. Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Moreover, the presence of Mediator
Judge Phillips and Special Master Golkin helped guarantee that the Parties did not compromise
some Class Members’ claims in order to benefit other Class Members.”).
250. See infra notes 25155 and accompanying text.
251. See MANUAL, supra note 1, § 10.224 (“[W]here diverse interests exist among the parties, the
court may designate a committee of counsel representing different interests.”).
252. Burch, supra note 15, at 77, 120–21.
253. Id. at 122–23.
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helpful with respect to creating conditions under which concerns of
disparate interests within the aggregate might be voiced and squarely fit
Professor Burch’s interest in cognition.254 But they do not fit a model of
conflict management rooted in economic theory, which requires that
counsel’s financial interests align with those of distinct sub-groups of
plaintiffs. Nevertheless Judge Barbier asserted the BP steering
committee’s representativeness and inclusiveness as a response to
adequacy objections regarding class counsel’s incentives. He noted:
“[t]he PSC was consulted and participated throughout the settlement
process. Whenever a particular category of claims was discussed during
negotiations, lawyers who had clients with such claims took an active
role in advising the negotiators.”255 That consultative approach left the
negotiators, though more fully informed, still conflicted, e.g., regarding
allocation with regard to competing claims.
6.

Proof in the Pudding—A Utilitarian Wedge

The Supreme Court was adamant that the lower courts resist the urge
to conflate the 23(a)(4) adequacy and 23(e) settlement fairness
inquiries.256 Courts today have found a new way to link the two
inquiries. First, if courts believe that compensation amounts are
reasonable under the circumstances, they discount the possibility that
there were tradeoffs among class members. For example, in his order
granting final approval to the BP economic loss class settlement, Judge
Barbier noted that there were no conflicts in part because “[t]he
differences within the [settlement] frameworks developed through armslength negotiation, are rationally related to the strengths and merits of
similarly situated claims.”257 Similarly, in the NFL litigation, the
appellate court found that “the terms of the settlement reflect that the
interests of current and future claimants were represented in the
negotiations,” because the terms were fair to both groups.258 Other lower

254. Id. at 121 (“[L]everaging outsiders’ expertise is a more viable means of achieving cognitive
diversity.”). See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109,
1156–60 (2011) (reviewing and applying the cognitive diversity literature to the selection of lead
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions under the PSLRA).
255. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 32.
256. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997).
257. Economic Final Approval Order, supra note 132, at 31.
258. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 43233 (3d Cir. 2016).
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federal courts have adopted similar approaches.259 Assessing common
practices, the Sixth Circuit observed:
[C]ourts customarily demand evidence of improper incentives
for the class representatives or class counsel—such as a promise
of excessive attorney fees in return for a low-cost, expedited
settlement—before abandoning the presumption that the class
representatives and counsel handled their responsibilities with
the independent vigor that the adversarial process demands.260
Second, lower courts have suggested that if settlement terms are
structured in an unfair way so as to disadvantage subsets of class
members without justification, then a fundamental conflict may be found
to exist. For example, in Dewey v. Volkswagen,261 the Third Circuit
confronted a settlement of a product defect case involving various
models of Volkswagen and Audi vehicles with sunroofs that were
allegedly defectively designed and thus prone to leaking without special
maintenance. The settlement provided various kinds of relief, including
most importantly an $8 million fund,262 which prompted objectors to
allege two different types of conflicts of interest. The Third Circuit’s
disparate treatment of them demonstrates the utilitarian creep that has
shaped application of Amchem and Ortiz in the years since they were
decided.
First, objectors in Dewey argued that the settlement implicated the
futures problem that so prominently figured in Amchem because the
named plaintiffs, who had all already suffered sunroof leaks, represented
a class that also included persons who had not.263 Objectors alleged that
persons who already suffered leaks had an interest in ensuring generous
immediate compensation, and were relatively less interested in assuring
compensation for failure to inform the class, or in assuring compensation
for “future protections,”264 such as inspections and funding for payment
of future damage claims. The Third Circuit acknowledged that “[t]his
259. For example, in In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a trial court’s finding that representation was adequate even though class counsel
representing two classes of purchasers chose a damages measure for settlement purposes that
favored one of them, finding that disfavored class members were unlikely to be successful on the
merits on the other. Id. at 462–63. The court held: “[w]ere we to decertify the current class it is
possible that no one will recover anything from Mego.” Id. at 463.
260. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 628 (6th Cir. 2007).
261. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2012).
262. Id. at 175.
263. Id. at 185.
264. Id. at 186.
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case bears some resemblance to Amchem and raises some of the same
concerns.”265 Nevertheless, the court found that a mere misalignment of
allocation preferences alone was not sufficiently fundamental to raise
conflict concerns,266 especially where, as in Dewey, persons who had
already experienced leaks were capable of experiencing future leaks, and
where the settlement’s terms were “structured to ensure that even past
claimants had an incentive to protect the rights of all members of the
class to make future claims” by actually providing for payment of such
claims.267
Dewey objectors were more successful with regard to the second
conflict they alleged, i.e., that between persons in a “reimbursement
group” who had priority under the settlement and all other class
members relegated to a “residual group” capable of making claims only
if any portion of the $8 million fund remained.268 The boundaries of the
residual group were determined by reference to the claims rate on a
vehicle model.269 But the claims rate that distinguished those in the two
groups was arbitrary, in that there was no justification for treating the
two groups differently but for the class representatives’ desire to
maximize the funds available to persons in the residual group.270 The
Third Circuit found this conflict to be sufficiently fundamental to trigger
adequacy of representation concerns.271 Why was this conflict different
from the futures issue? The court found the degree of misalignment of
interest here to be starker than with regard to the differential preferences
of persons who had already experienced an injury and those who had
not, because the reimbursement and residual plaintiffs’ preferences were
relatively more oppositional.272 More to the point, the court found that
the “structure of the settlement agreement itself,”273 which treated the
groups differently for no apparent reason, was proof that the conflict was
fundamental. That is, an unfair settlement term proved the existence of a
265. Id. at 185.
266. Id. at 186 (“[E]ven if the representative plaintiffs did value protections for future claimants
less than other members of the class, we do not believe that, again on this record, their differing
valuations would create a fundamental conflict sufficient to undermine their ability to adequately
represent the class.”).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 187.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 187–88.
271. Id. at 187.
272. Id. at 188 (“The problem is that the interests of the representative plaintiffs and the interests
of the residual group aligned in opposing directions.”).
273. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
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structural conflict. That is why the court posed as a solution either
amendment of the settlement to eliminate the arbitrary distinction made
between “reimbursement” and “residual” claimants or subclassing.274
Dewey illustrates an intermediate appellate court not only giving
Amchem a narrow read on the required degree of misalignment of
interest, but flipping Amchem on its head275 by relying on an analysis of
the fairness of the settlement’s terms to determine whether conflicts of
interest are sufficiently fundamental to call the adequacy of
representation into question. This reliance on the fairness of settlement
terms to demonstrate the inadequacy of representation is evident even in
the Second Circuit. In Payment Card Interchange, discussed above, the
court went out of its way to demonstrate the relative stinginess of the
relief accorded to (b)(2) settlement class members relative to (b)(3)
settlement class members276 and to criticize the unfairly broad scope of
the release made by (b)(2) members.277
7.

Deference to Trial Court Judges

A last element of the attack on Amchem and Ortiz concerns the level
of deference to the trial court judge deciding whether to subclass.
Dissenting in Amchem, Justice Breyer wrote: “[w]hat constitutes
adequate representation is a question of fact that depends on the
circumstances of each case.”278 Dissenting in Ortiz, Justice Breyer again
274. Id. at 189; see also In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 307 (3d Cir. 2005) (looking to
disparate and unfair settlement terms as a basis to find representation inadequate, in that case,
because the class representatives did not have TILA or HOEPA claims and the settlement failed to
provide any recovery for such claims).
275. In Amchem, the Court acknowledged objections to the relatively sweeter deal received by
class counsel’s inventory clients whose claims were settled outside the class action. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 606 (1997). But the intra-class conflict of interest on which
the Court based its decision did not involve those non-class members. As to the core conflict
between presently injured class members and those whose injuries had not yet manifested, the Court
noted the existence of settlement terms that limited their recovery. Id. at 627 (“[N]o adjustment for
inflation; only a few claimants per year can opt out at the back end; and loss-of-consortium claims
are extinguished with no compensation.”). But the Court did not deem these provisions to be unfair.
Instead, the Court found it notable that these terms “reflect essential allocation decisions designed to
confine compensation and limit defendants’ liability.” Id. at 595.
276. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223, 239
(“This bargain is particularly unreasonable for merchants that begin accepting Visa or MasterCard
after July 20, 2021.”).
277. Id. (“Merchants that cannot surcharge (by reason of state law or rules of American Express)
and those that begin operating after July 20, 2021 suffer an unreasonable tradeoff between relief and
release that demonstrates their representation did not comply with due process.”).
278. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 637 (quoting 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1765, at 271 (3d ed. 2007)).
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emphasized the need to defer to trial courts’ assessments regarding the
costs and benefits of subclassing, arguing that the trial court’s fact
findings regarding the relative insignificance of the alleged allocation
conflicts should not be overturned.279 The majority in each case
obviously disagreed—not with the abuse of discretion standard, but with
its application in each case. But intermediate appellate courts today
borrow liberally from Breyer’s playbook. In In re Insurance Brokerage
Antitrust Litigation,280 in a decision declining to disturb the trial court’s
exercise of discretion not to require subclasses, the Third Circuit held:
“[b]ecause ‘the decision whether to certify a subclass requires a
balancing of costs and benefits that can best be performed by a district
judge,’ we accord substantial deference to district courts with respect to
their resolution of this issue.”281 Similarly, in both the BP and NFL
cases, the intermediate appellate courts found the courts’ subclassing
choices to be well within the trial court judges’ exercise of discretion.282
D.

The New Conflicts Management Regime

The new conflicts management regime emerging from the trenches of
lower federal courts is revealed in the two case studies sketched in the
preceding sections. It is modest, rather than bold, in that, with few
exceptions, it applies to a relatively limited universe of conflicts. It is
regulatory, rather than market based, to the extent courts now rely on the
judge’s ability to manage conflicts by supervising counsel directly or via
neutrals. And it elevates utilitarian concerns over the intrinsic value of
fair process to the extent it looks to the fairness of settlement outcomes
to judge whether representation was adequate. In short, the conflicts
management regime is the mirror image of the one built by the Supreme
Court in Amchem and Ortiz.

279. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 87881 (1999).
280. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009).
281. Id. (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 202 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Int’l
Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497
F.3d 615, 629 (6th Cir. 2007) (“No doubt, the district courts could have drawn additional class lines,
but they did not abuse their discretion in choosing not to do so.”).
282. See In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 429 (3d Cir. 2016); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d
790, 814 (5th Cir. 2014).
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III. AN INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT: THE MDL MODEL FOR
MANAGING MASS TORTS AND THE INCONVENIENCE OF
SUBCLASSING
The preceding Part addressed how we got from Amchem to BP and
the NFL class settlements. This Part explores why lower federal courts
have effectively flipped the regulatory regime, providing an institutional
account.283 As noted, at the time Amchem and Ortiz were decided,
federal courts were jurisdictionally challenged with regard to mass tort
class actions, and relatedly, the reverse auction was the most glaring
ethical challenge of the day. Congress and courts responded with new
formal and informal institutional arrangements for managing mass tort
and other geographically dispersed class actions that together constitute
the new “MDL model,”284 the general features of which are described
below and were visible in both the BP and NFL case studies. This new
model has had the effect of concentrating multijurisdictional class
actions in federal courts; deferring class certification to later stages of
proceedings, in mass torts mostly for settlement purposes; nudging
federal courts to innovate new informal case management techniques
that give them more control over case outcomes; substantially muting
the reverse auction problem that concerned courts at the time Amchem
and Ortiz were decided; and making settlement the only realistic
endgame.
The new MDL model for managing litigation of mass torts and other
geographically dispersed harms was born of mistrust of class counsel,285
but, for the reasons provided below, has had the effect of inspiring lower
federal courts to trust them all the more at the time of settlement.286 The
283. A competing account might involve the tension among different conceptual frames for
addressing the “governance” problem posed by class actions. For a survey of “models of class
action governance,” see Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance,
37 IND. L. REV. 65, 92–115 (2003) (surveying “market,” “democracy-based,” and “judicialadministrative” solutions to the class action governance problem). The virtue of an institutional
account is that it explains why one conceptual framework would be more appealing to courts than
another.
284. See supra note 12.
285. Erichson, supra note 60, at 1594–96.
286. Professor Marcus predicted that at least some plaintiffs and their counsel might actually end
up looking favorably upon the jurisdictional regime CAFA wrought. See Richard L. Marcus,
Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2008) (“By the
1980s and 1990s, consternation about the 1966 expansion of class actions shifted markedly as
defendants learned how to use class actions to accomplish the goals they wanted to achieve. So also,
a quarter century from now, many may look back at CAFA as enabling legislation that furthered the
goal of consumer class actions rather than the interests of the business establishment that pressed for
its passage.”).
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Amchem framework for regulating class conflicts now feels both less
necessary and far less convenient, insofar as it fosters competition
among subclass counsel in a system characterized by substantial court
control aimed at facilitating cooperation among counsel and eventual
global settlement.
A.

The MDL Model: New Formal and Informal Institutional
Arrangements for Managing Mass Torts

1.

Formal: Early Concentration of Mass Torts in Federal Courts and
Limits on Litigation Classes

a.

CAFA and 28 U.S.C. § 1407

Parallel class proceedings in federal and state courts and concerns
regarding outlier state court jurisdictions handling cases of national
significance prompted calls for an exclusive forum model.287 In 2005,
Congress responded with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which
modified the diversity statute in two ways that facilitate the
concentration of mass tort litigation in federal court. First, in an effort to
provide for federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance, even if they involved state law claims,288 CAFA federalized
much class action litigation. It did so by permitting aggregation of
claims to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for
cases involving more than $5 million and, in such cases, allowing
removal to federal court on minimal rather than complete diversity. 289
CAFA has successfully shifted much class practice to federal court,290

287. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 517 (1996)
(“[T]he move toward an exclusive [federal] forum model for large-scale cases is necessary and
desirable.” (bracketed text added)); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1416 (2006) (portraying CAFA as “a bulwark against
improper or opportunistic state-court oversight of the national market”).
288. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
289. “Minimal” diversity requires that any plaintiff and any defendant be citizens of different
states. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
290. Erichson, supra note 60, at 1607–14 (documenting the post-CAFA shift in class practice
from state to federal court); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class
Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1723, 1750–62 (2008) (noting a marked increase post-CAFA in the number of state-law
cases filed in the first instance in federal court and in the number of diversity removals of class
actions).

10 - Ratner.docx (Do Not Delete)

844

5/30/2017 1:01 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:785

even if it leaves some multistate class actions in state court due to the
home state and local controversy exceptions.291
Second, CAFA expanded federal jurisdiction with regard to “mass
actions.”292 A mass action includes any civil action other than a class
action in which “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are
proposed to be tried jointly293 on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims
involve common questions of law or fact.”294 Though the statutory
regime does not federalize all mass tort claims,295 it has the effect of
federalizing nearly all attempts to pursue such claims through trial en
masse, whether via consolidated proceedings or class actions.
Functionally, CAFA intersects with the MDL statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407, to not only federalize, but to also centralize mass tort litigation
before a single trial court judge selected by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation. The expansion of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction coincides with what Professor Marcus characterizes as a
“maximalist”296 use of the transfer and coordination statute. Because
Section 1407 requires only “minimal commonality,”297 the Panel’s
aggressive use of it results in the now-routine creation of sprawling
super-aggregates that include not only large numbers of persons, but
persons with varied claims and injuries. That maximalist approach,
evident long before Congress enacted CAFA, has dramatically

291. The “local controversy” exception to CAFA applies when two-thirds of the plaintiffs and at
least one defendant against whom “significant relief” is sought are citizens of the forum state, and
certain other conditions are met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (2012). The “home state” exception
applies if two-thirds or more of the proposed class members and the primary defendants are citizens
of the forum state. See id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
292. Id. § 1332(d).
293. The intermediate appellate courts have split regarding the meaning of the phrase “proposed
to be tried.” Compare In re Abbot Labs., Inc., 698 F.3d 568, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2012) (joint trial
proposal can be “implicit”), with Gutowski v. McKesson Corp., No. C 12-6056 CW, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26333, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (casting doubt on the approach taken by the
Seventh Circuit in Abbot and citing Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) for
the proposition that CAFA’s mass action provisions should be read strictly and narrowly).
294. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). CAFA’s effect on non-class mass torts is limited. For
example, it does not include purely local matters or cases consolidated only for pretrial purposes. Id.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii).
295. Mark S. Werner, The Viability and Strategic Significance of Class Action Alternatives Under
CAFA’s Mass Action Provisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 465, 467 (2015) (noting that because the objective
of mass tort litigation is normally settlement, not a joint trial, the omission of mass actions
consolidated for pretrial purposes creates a potentially large loophole).
296. Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use
of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2266 (2008) (“[T]he
operation of § 1407 has tended in a maximalist direction.”).
297. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 667, 688 (2013).
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intensified since that time, in terms of the number of MDL petitions
granted each year and the size and scale of the largest of the MDLs.298
This is especially true with regard to mass torts, which dominate the
MDL docket in terms of the number of transferred cases, and
particularly dominate the large-scale MDL docket.299 Whereas in 2002,
MDL cases made up 16 percent of the federal caseload, they now make
up 36 percent of the civil caseload, a number that grows to 45.6 percent
of federal civil cases pending as of June 2014 if prisoner and social
security cases are removed from the mix300—and the vast majority of
those are concentrated in a small number of giant MDL mass tort
proceedings.301
b.

Limits on Mass Tort Litigation Classes; The Persistence of
Settlement Classes

Starting in the mid-1990s, courts and rule-makers placed new limits
on the certification of litigation classes, especially with regard to mass
torts.302 Two changes in particular are relevant to this analysis. First,
rule-makers and courts effectively pushed back the certification
determination to later stages of the procedural timeline by amending
298. See, e.g., John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2225, 2230 (2008) (noting substantial growth post-CAFA in the number of MDL petitions and the
total number of ongoing MDL dockets); Thomas Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, 99
JUDICATURE 36, 42 (2015) (“In the last ten years, the concentration of the large MDL cases—
virtually all of the which are mass-tort cases—has risen exponentially.”); Standards and Best
Practices for Large and Mass Tort MDLs, DUKE LAW CENTER FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES (Mar. 3,
2016), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/standards_and_best_practices
_for_large_and_mass-tort_mdls.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YJM-A2YD] [hereinafter DUKE STANDARDS
AND BEST PRACTICES] (“Not only is the overall number of actions in MDLs growing, these actions
are becoming more concentrated in a small number of mass-tort MDLs, primarily products liability
and particularly pharmaceutical and health-care cases. Of the MDLs pending in June 2014, nearly
88% of them were consolidated in only 18 MDLs—16 product liability and 2 other mass torts.”).
299. See Metzloff, supra note 298, at 43 (“The reality with respect to mass-tort claims is radically
different. The MDL process has come to be dominated by large mass-tort dockets typically
involving thousands of underlying actions. Indeed, over 95 percent of the total actions currently
consolidated through the MDL process are mass-tort cases. This represents a significant evolution in
the utilization of the MDL process that initially took a restrictive approach to the mass-tort
context.”).
300. DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at x–xi.
301. See supra note 298.
302. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 95 (2015) (“Mass tort
class actions quickly blossomed at the end of the 1980s and flourished until they were curtailed by
the Supreme Court in the 1990s.”); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Class Certification
and Class Settlement: Findings from Federal Question Cases, 2003–2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 315,
331 (2011) (“Since the 1990s, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to make
class certification more difficult.”).
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Rule 23(c)(1)303 and by requiring the class certification determination to
be based on a rigorous analysis of evidence, even if that evidence
overlaps with the merits.304 Second, courts made it harder to certify
litigation classes in mass torts, which frequently involve individual
issues of causation and injury and varying state laws, by raising the bar
on commonality under both 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3).305
Though the class action’s death has been heralded in general and with
regard to mass torts in particular,306 and though a significant theme in
recent commentary is of a switch from class to administrative
aggregation,307 mass tort settlement classes, the door to which Amchem
left open,308 are still routinely even if less frequently309 embraced.310
303. Prior Rule 23 read that certification should be considered as “soon as practicable.” Pursuant
to a 2003 amendment, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) now states that certification should be considered “[a]t an
early practicable time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
304. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351–52 (2011).
305. See, e.g., id. at 349–50 (to satisfy 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, plaintiffs must show
that a common contention is “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24
(1997) (differences in exposure, causation, and state law undermined plaintiffs’ efforts to show
predominance of common issues of fact or law).
306. See supra note 13.
307. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute
Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 551 (2013) (“For those actors for whom the class action
presents frustrating barriers to resolving massive litigation on favorable terms, there has been a
decided shift away from the class action towards the creative invention of class-avoidance
mechanisms.”); Sherman, The MDL Model, supra note 12, at 2223 (describing the MDL “model” as
an “alternative” to class actions); Willging & Lee III, supra note 12, at 777 (“This Article examines
the extent to which available empirical research supports the impressions of scholars that a shift has
occurred from using class action procedures to using multidistrict-litigation procedures to manage
and resolve tort litigation in the federal courts.”).
308. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 619 (“[S]ettlement is relevant to a class certification.”);
see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1507
(2013) (“The recent renaissance in settlement classes allows defendants to obtain global peace when
they agree to a settlement price, but they can resist collective resolution in all other cases so that
litigation is extremely costly for plaintiffs to pursue.”).
309. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 819 (2010) (finding almost no mass tort settlements in
federal court in the period 2006–07); Willging & Lee III, supra note 302, at 341 (noticing fewer
mass tort class actions in federal courts, overall, compared to the 1990s).
310. See, e.g., In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:07-MD-1873, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146680 (E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2012) (resolving product liability claims in an MDL
via settlement on a class basis); Klein v. O’Neal, 705 F. Supp. 2d 632 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (certifying
settlement class in personal injury drug case); In re Serzone Prods. Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221
(S.D. W. Va. 2005) (certifying settlement class involving allegedly defective drug that caused
personal injuries); In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 359 (N.D. Ohio 2001)
(certifying settlement of medical device products liability settlement class); Brown v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine)) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
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When these class settlements take place within liberally constituted
administrative aggregates, as happened in the BP and NFL case studies,
the result is settlement classes that can be as sprawling as the asbestos
class the Supreme Court found objectionable in Amchem.
2.

Informal: Trial Judges Organize Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Tightly
Control Pretrial Activity

The formal moves just described enabled informal arrangements that
have resulted in an unprecedented level of judicial control that MDL
judges now enjoy over mass tort proceedings. Not only have judges
selectively imported class action management procedures into
multidistrict litigation proceedings relating to the appointment and
payment of counsel,311 but they have also innovated new ways to control
every other phase, including pleading, discovery, settlement negotiation,
and bellwether trials.
One of the first items of business for the MDL judge after transfer and
coordination is the conferral of an exclusive right to manage “common
benefit work”312 on a subset of plaintiffs’ counsel (“common benefit
counsel”).313 In large mass torts, this involves two steps: the appointment
and organization of common benefit counsel314 and the enumeration of
their spheres of responsibility and authority, and entry of case

No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (certifying settlement
class in personal injury drug case in consolidated proceeding involving 176 cases and 8 million
people). See generally Sullivan v. DB Invs., 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J.,
concurring) (“Despite initial uncertainty the opinions might pose formidable obstacles for settling
massive, complex cases, this has not, for the most part, proved to be the case. Nonetheless, class
settlement in mass tort cases (especially personal injury claims) remains problematic, leading some
practitioners to avoid the class action device—most prominently in the recent $4.85 billion mass
settlement of 50,000 claims arising out of the use of the drug Vioxx.”).
311. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2009).
312. Silver & Miller, supra note 12, at 143 (common benefit work includes “all litigation-related
services displaying a property known as jointness: when produced or performed once, many
plaintiffs can use such services without reducing their value for any other plaintiff”).
313. See generally DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 42 (“MDL
Standard 3: [t]he transferee judge should select lead counsel, liaison counsel, and committee
members as soon as practicable after the JPML transfers the litigation.”); MANUAL, supra note 1,
§§ 10.221–.224 (describing trial court’s role in organization plaintiffs’ counsel in multiparty
litigation).
314. Common benefit counsel typically include some combination of: (1) liaison counsel; (2) lead
counsel; and (3) executive and/or steering committees, along with sub-committees created to
address specific issues (e.g., expert discovery). The size and complexity of the common benefit
counsel arrangements depend on the size of the case. See DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES,
supra note 298, at 40–41.
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management orders ensuring payment for common benefit work out of
individual recoveries.315
Also in the early stages of mass tort proceedings, before any
settlement is negotiated, MDL trial courts enter orders assuring payment
for common benefit work via assessments on MDL plaintiff recoveries
by trial or settlement directed to be paid into a common benefit fund to
be used to spread the costs of common benefit work across all plaintiffs
who benefit from it.316 An example is the order arranging payment and
reimbursement of costs for common benefit counsel in the Stryker
Rejuvenate and ABGII hip implant products liability MDL.317 The
order—levying a three percent holdback on all plaintiffs for common
benefit fees and one percent for common costs318—applies to all cases
included in the MDL as well as “all cases or claims (filed or unfiled) of
all Participating Counsel . . . and all cases or claims (filed or unfiled) in
state or federal court where the Participating Counsel has a fee

315. Professors Silver and Miller refer to these moves (along with fee transfers from and caps on
non-lead counsel) as the key components of the “quasi-class action approach to MDL
management.” Silver & Miller, supra note 12, at 110–11. This Article recognizes these
arrangements as central to all mass tort practice, including class actions, and views them through the
lens of efforts to inspire cooperation among counsel.
316. Federal courts claim the inherent authority to enter such orders. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 546–47 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades
on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Eldon E. Fallon,
Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371, 379 (2014) (“Regardless of
the legal basis given to explain its use, the common benefit doctrine has been consistently used and
is well established as the justification for the payment of common benefit fees in MDLs.”). MDL
trial court judges have extended the contribution requirements to state court litigants via orders
aimed at the defendants over whom they have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amended Holdback Order Re:
Common Benefit Fees and Costs at 3, In re Biomet M2A Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 3:12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2015), ECF No. 3022 (establishing a six percent common
benefit “holdback,” and noting with regard to “plaintiffs’ attorneys litigating Biomet Hip Implant
cases in state courts, the Amended Holdback Order will apply if the respective state court litigant
and counsel sought the benefit of the work product of PSC II.”). See generally DUKE STANDARDS
AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 73–74.
317. See Order Establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund, In re Stryker Rejuvenate &
ABG II Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 13-2441 (D. Minn. May 28, 2014), ECF No. 327.
Similar orders have been entered in other recent MDLs. See, e.g., Order No. 42 [Establishing
Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund] at 15–19, In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig.,
No. 1:14-md-02543 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015), ECF No. 743; Case Management Order No. 16
(Establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund) at 4–6, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate)
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02385 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2012), ECF No. 61.
318. Order Establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund at 6, In re Stryker Rejuvenate &
ABG II Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 13-2441 (D. Minn. May 28, 2014), ECF No. 327.
Counsel outside the MDL who agree to be bound by the order, e.g., in recognition of their use of
MDL work product, must pay a higher holdback amount for common benefit fees of five percent
ninety days after their first filed case is docketed in any jurisdiction.
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interest.”319 The term “Participating Counsel” is defined as “any lawyer
(and his or her law firm) who represents a client with a case on file in the
MDL now or in the future, or any other lawyer (and his or her law firm)
who signs the Participation Agreement or uses the work product of the
MDL.”320 This innovation with regard to securing common benefit fees
is a marked departure from past practice.
a.

Common Benefit Counsel Selection Criteria

Whereas adequate representation in class actions turns to a great
extent on an analysis of conflicts, in MDLs it does not. With the deferral
of class certification to much later stages of proceedings, the law of
administrative,321 not class, aggregation provides the animating
principles for organizing counsel in mass torts. Judges appointing MDL
leadership at the outset of such proceedings, unconstrained by rule or
statute, typically identify by modern convention three characteristics as
paramount: experience, financial capacity, and cooperativeness.322
Cooperativeness as a trait is normally not defined, but presumably
implies the ability to minimize and settle disputes with other plaintiffs’
counsel and defendants. In addition, the trend is toward appointment of
steering committees that are broadly inclusive and representative.
319. Id. at 2.
320. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The extent of the federal MDL court’s ability to levy such
assessments is the subject of litigation and has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court,
which just passed up an opportunity to enter the fray. See Phipps Grp. v. Downing (In re
Genetically Modified Rice Litig.), 764 F.3d 864, 864 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming trial court’s levy
against payments to non-MDL participants who enrolled in the settlement and thereby agreed to pay
common fund assessments), cert. denied, Phipps Grp. v. Downing, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1455
(2015).
321. The “law of administrative aggregation” includes 28 U.S.C. § 1407, FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a),
case law interpreting them, the orders of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and, most
importantly, the orders of trial courts managing administratively aggregated matters, including the
orders appointing counsel to leadership roles in such cases.
322. Courts identify these traits in the orders they enter soliciting applications for leadership
roles. See, e.g., Pretrial Order #1 at 9, In re Bos. Sci. Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 2326 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter In re Bos. Sci.] (“The main criteria for
PSC membership will be: (a) willingness and availability to commit to a time-consuming project;
(b) ability to work cooperatively with others; and (c) professional experience in this type of
litigation”), http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/MDL/boston/pdfs/PTO_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SM6WZQN]; Initial Conference Order at 6, In re Yasmin and YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2009), ECF No. 83
[hereinafter In re Yasmin] (“The Court intends to appoint Plaintiffs’ lead counsel and/or a
Plaintiffs’ steering committee, as well as Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel. . . . The main criteria for these
appointments are (1) willingness and ability to commit to a time-consuming process; (2) ability to
work cooperatively with others; (3) professional experience in this type of litigation; and (4) access
to sufficient resources to advance the litigation in a timely manner.”).
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Cooperativeness as a selection criterion is particularly heavily
emphasized.323 The repeat player phenomenon documented by
Professors Burch and Williams324 reinforces the judges’ ability to select
for that characteristic, based on their direct experience, a review of the
applicants’ settlement records, and/or on conversations judges
informally have with each other. An example of this is the recent VW
emissions litigation, where, when appointing repeat player and leading
member of the plaintiffs’ mass tort bar Elizabeth Cabraser325 as lead
counsel, Judge Breyer specifically noted her support among fellow
plaintiffs’ counsel and his familiarity with and admiration of her work in
a prior case, which suggested to him that “Ms. Cabraser will effectively
represent and guide the plaintiffs toward a resolution that is in their best
interests.”326 This suggests that persons selected are likely to fit the
desired profile, and that persons, once selected, are likely to adhere to
that profile in order to be eligible for leadership roles in future cases,
either as court appointees or as members of sub-committees.

323. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2724637 [https://perma.cc/MF95-3728]; Burch, supra note
15, at 73, 86; Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Considerations in Choosing Counsel for Multidistrict
Litigation Cases and Mass Tort Cases, 74 LA. L. REV. 391, 392 (2014). This selection criterion
arguably amplifies the cooperation that litigation by committee naturally inspires. See, e.g., Dando
B. Cellini, An Overview of Antitrust Class Actions, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1501, 1505 (1980)
(describing litigation by “committee” as inspiring a certain level of cooperation: “[a] good trial
lawyer’s tenacious pursuit of his own theory of the case and his unwillingness to compromise his
own client’s interests in the slightest respect for the good of the majority are almost immediately
taken as signs of pigheadedness on the part of this fellow counsel. The result is that he is quickly
ostracized from the decision-making inner circle of lawyers on his side of the case”).
324. Burch & Williams, supra note 323, at 21 (“On the plaintiffs’ side, repeat players . . . held
767 out of 1,221 available leadership roles, or 62.8 percent. Fifty attorneys were named as lead
lawyers in five or more multidistrict litigations and those 50 attorneys occupied 30 percent of all
plaintiff-side leadership positions. . . . Repeat play among plaintiffs’ law firms was even more
evident. Again, even though only 40.7 percent of law firms were repeat players . . . lawyers from
those 70 firms occupied 78 percent of all available leadership positions.”). Professors Burch’s and
Williams’ study confirms what others predicted in the period just before and after the enactment of
CAFA, i.e., that it would privilege a select group of large national plaintiffs’ firms and concentrate
them in federal court MDL proceedings. See Erichson, supra note 60, at 1621 (noting that CAFA
favors the nation’s largest class action firms (citing Deborah Hensler as quoted in Michael Bobelian,
Congress Eyes Major Class Action Reforms, N.J. L.J. at 9 (Jan. 12, 2004))).
325. See Elizabeth J. Carabraser, LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMMAN & BERNSTEIN, http://
www.lieffcabraser.com/Attorneys/Elizabeth-J-Cabraser.shtml [https://perma.cc/DX54-CV6Z].
326. See Pretrial Order No. 7: Order Appointing Plaintiffs’ Lead Counsel, Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee, and Government Coordinating Counsel at 1–2, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel”
Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016), ECF
No. 1084.
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The move toward inclusive leadership committees is of yet more
recent vintage and gaining traction.327 It has two components. One is
diversity of membership in terms of the members’ personal
characteristics, such as gender.328 The second is inclusiveness in terms of
ensuring that the PSC represents the broadest possible swath of
claimants or claims.329 It is the latter meaning that is of greatest
relevance to this analysis because it dovetails with changed judicial
attitudes towards conflicts management and foreshadows one of the
substitutes for incentive-based structural assurances of fairness. This
desire for inclusiveness in leadership structures explains in part what
appear at first blush to be unwieldly and large steering committees. The
VW emissions MDL again serves as an example. Judge Breyer
appointed one lawyer as MDL lead plaintiffs’ counsel, and proceeded to
appoint twenty additional lawyers from twenty other law firms to the
steering committee.330 The number of common benefit counsel
appointed in that proceeding is due in part to its complexity and in part
to plaintiffs’ litigation funding needs. But it is also about creating the
kind of buy-in by key counsel to the aggregate settlement process that,
as explained below, is at odds with conflicts management approaches
that rely on competition or adversarialism among plaintiffs’ counsel
representing warring camps.
Judges could consider the impact on conflicts as a criterion when
selecting common benefit counsel at the front end of mass tort
proceedings, a necessary first step for managing conflicts via market
mechanisms. But, as noted, nothing in the text of the MDL statute
requires courts to do so.331 Rule 23(g)(3) is a bridge between, on the one
327. DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 46.
328. See DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 46–47, 58. U.S. District
Judge Kathryn Vratil of Kansas recently received attention for appointing the first majority-female
plaintiffs’ steering committee in an MDL that includes a majority of women, the MDL involving
Ethicon, Inc.’s power morcellators, devices used in laparoscopic uterine surgeries, which are alleged
to cause cancer. See In re Ethicon, Power Morcellator Prods. Liab. Litig., No.2:15-md-02652 (D.
Kan. Nov. 19, 2015), ECF No. 10; Amanda Bronstad, In a First, Women Compose Majority of MDL
Committee, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202742961283/Ina-First-Women-Compose-Majority-of-MDL-Committee?slreturn=20160205180140 [https://perma.
cc/5G8S-ULUX] (touting the gender diversity reflected in the order as a positive development). But
see Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multidistrict Litigation, 64
EMORY L.J. 329, 363–65 (2014) (presenting data regarding the lack of demographic diversity on
MDL committees, especially regarding gender).
329. See DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at 57 (“Best Practice 4D(iii):
[t]he transferee judge should consider the number, type, and nature of the applicant’s cases in mass
tort and common disaster litigation.”).
330. Pretrial Order No. 7, supra note 326, at 3–4.
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
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hand, 28 U.S.C. § 1407’s relatively open-ended and lax appointment
standards, and, on the other, Rule 23’s relatively more specific, stringent
standards. That subsection of Rule 23, added by rule amendment in
2003, permits trial courts to “designate interim counsel to act on behalf
of a putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a
class action.”332 Courts exercising their discretion to appoint interim
class counsel are required to apply the same criteria they would use
when appointing class counsel on a motion for class certification,
assessing adequacy of representation by attempting to uncover and
address conflicts of interest.333 But the existence of a doctrinal vehicle
for assessing conflicts at the front end of MDL proceedings has proved
to be of limited utility without a requirement that courts use it.
The trial courts in both the BP and NFL litigations followed the MDL
model, appointing common benefit counsel early in the proceedings
without contemporaneously appointing interim class counsel or
otherwise using the standards of Rule 23(g) to guide the choice of
counsel.
b.

Judicial Control over Pleading, Discovery, Trial, and Settlement
Discussions

Professor Richard Marcus has characterized the rules of civil
procedure as providing for a level of “adult supervision” by the judge in
civil litigation.334 Modern mass tort practice goes further, in some
instances taking the parties out of the process altogether, creating a
degree of cooperation by fiat at all stages of the litigation, including
pleading, discovery, and bellwether trials. Courts are also regularly
involved, directly or through appointed neutrals, in settlement
negotiations.
By way of example, courts managing mass tort proceedings now
coordinate pleading practice by entering case management orders that
call for form pleadings, sometimes bundling those pleadings to funnel

332. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3).
333. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 56, 57 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (“Although neither the federal rules nor the advisory committee notes expressly so state, it
appears to be generally accepted that the considerations set out in Rule 23(g)(1)(C), which governs
the appointment of class counsel once a class is certified, apply equally to the designation of interim
class counsel before certification.”).
334. Richard Marcus, Cooperation and Litigation: Thoughts on the American Experience, 61
KAN. L. REV. 821, 842–43, 846 (2013) (sampling rules that “urge or require behavior that could be
called cooperative”).
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motion practice as Judge Barbier did in the BP litigation.335 The order
entered in the Stryker hip implant MDL is representative.336 It requires
common benefit counsel to “develop Master Long and Short-Form
Complaints that set forth all potential claims that individual plaintiffs
may assert against Defendants in this MDL” and which “supersede and
replace all claims pled in any previously filed Complaint.”337
In discovery, mass tort judges may substitute their own agendas, and
even specific requests, for those of the parties. An example is the core
discovery order in the World Trade Center first responder litigation that
involved approximately 10,000 personal injury claims consolidated for
pretrial purposes under Rule 42 before Judge Hellerstein in the Southern
District of New York.338 Noting that the parties, left to their own
devices, had failed to make progress in discovery, Judge Hellerstein
appointed two special masters to (1) write discovery and (2) prepare a
database for converting it into useful information, and ordered the
parties to respond.339 The judge later attributed successful resolution of
the matter in large part to this usurpation of litigant autonomy. 340 While
Hellerstein’s decision to entirely circumvent the parties is unusual,
substantial judicial control over the sequence, timing, and content of
discovery in modern mass tort practice is not.341
Judge Hellerstein’s control of discovery was also partly aimed at
building the basis for bellwether trials.342 While courts’ approaches to
structuring bellwether trials vary, the scheduling of such trials is a

335. In the BP oil spill MDL, Judge Barbier required the filing of master complaints in “pleading
bundles,” corresponding to major categories of claims, such as economic loss and personal injury.
See Pretrial Order No. 11 [Case Management Order No. 1] at 2–7, In re Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md02179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010), ECF No. 569.
336. See Pretrial Order No. 6, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.,
No. 13-2441 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2013), ECF No. 119; see also Pretrial Order #12 (Master and Short
Form Complaint and Master Responsive Pleadings; Direct Filing), In re Bos. Sci. Corp., Pelvic
Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.wvsd.uscourts.
gov/MDL/boston/pdfs/PTO_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVZ8-YJME].
337. Pretrial Order No. 6, supra note 336, at 7.
338. See generally Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski,
Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 177 (2012).
339. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Clarifying Order Regulating Discovery at 2–4, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 1:21-mc-00100 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007), ECF No. 619.
340. Hellerstein et al., supra note 338, at 142–44.
341. See, e.g., Plaintiff Fact Sheet, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
3:12-MD-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2012), ECF No. 54-1 (form discovery).
342. Hellerstein et al., supra note 338, at 144–52.
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routine part of mass tort case management.343 Bellwether trial outcomes
are not binding on members of the aggregate, but nevertheless may
impact them by shaping the allocation of common benefit resources and
settlement efforts. The mechanism for selecting bellwethers, often in the
early phases of proceedings, has the effect of narrowing the road toward
specific categories of claims and issues that are thought to be important
and representative.344 Judicial management of discovery and the
bellwether process in turn facilitates settlement discussions,345 which
MDL trial court judges aggressively promote346 and either directly or
indirectly monitor.
It’s the one-two punch of concentration of authority in cooperative
common benefit counsel whom the judges then micro-manage that has
put judges, not counsel, at the center of mass torts, and has limited some
of the worst excesses that plagued the institutional arrangements in place
at the time the Court decided Amchem and Ortiz. As the following
section explains, there are still spaces for disputes and competition
among plaintiffs’ counsel, and of course between the parties, but they
are constrained by the bureaucratizing, standardizing, and prioritizing
that characterize modern mass tort case management.
B.

The Faded Threat of Reverse Auctions

The likelihood of reverse auctions in mass torts has been substantially
reduced as a result of the new institutional arrangements described in the
343. See generally Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials
in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2358 (2008).
344. See Amended Case Management Order No. 24 Bellwether Trial Selection Plan at 5, In re
Yasmin and YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2010), ECF No. 1329 (“Most modern plans seem to disfavor random
selection in order to have better control over the representative characteristics of the cases selected”
for bellwether trials); MANUAL, supra note 1, § 22.315 (selected “plaintiffs and their claims should
be representative of the range of cases”).
345. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANAGING
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES 44 (2011) (discussing usefulness of
bellwether trials in establishing claim values to be used for settlement purposes).
346. Judicial involvement in settlement is heightened in MDL practice in general and mass tort
litigation in particular. Id. at 4 (“One of the values of MDL proceedings is that they bring before a
single judge all of the federal cases, parties, and counsel making up the litigation. They therefore
afford a unique opportunity for negotiation of a global settlement.”). For example, in the Pradaxa
litigation, the court ordered the parties to confer about settlement at least once per month and to
include a court appointed mediator in discussions. See Case Management Order No. 6 Unified Case
Management Plan at 6–8, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2012), ECF No. 42; Case Management Order No. 39
Appointing Mediator at 1–2, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. July 15, 2013), ECF No. 233.
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preceding section. Plaintiffs’ counsel are now concentrated in a single
federal court proceeding,347 arranged into broadly representative and
inclusive leadership committees, and are guaranteed payment for
common benefit work if plaintiffs—any plaintiffs—win a judgment or
settlement. Courts insist on substantial case development before even
considering class certification and cabin adversarialism among
plaintiffs’ counsel by tightly controlling all phases of litigation and
settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel thus lack the incentive (role-insecurity)
and the ability (early certification by inexperienced and isolated trial
court judges) to race against each other to a class judgment.
At least two spaces still exist in which plaintiffs’ counsel can
conceivably engage in behaviors associated with reverse auctions. First,
though the likelihood of a state court resolution is now low, it is not
eliminated. Some state court actions within a category of mass tort
litigation may still evade federal court litigation, because, among other
reasons, they involve non-diverse parties and are not class or mass
actions, or otherwise fall within one of CAFA’s exceptions. The
centrality of MDL proceedings and more active coordination between
federal and state courts make it unlikely that defendants would now
choose a state forum for a global resolution, especially given the red
flags doing so would raise. But the state court is still formally
available.348
Second, within a PSC, members may attempt to gain position with
defendants and thus status and control over settlement by adopting less
adversarial postures than their peers. This dynamic can occur any time
more than one lawyer is given responsibility for engaging in settlement
discussions with defendants, even in a consolidated proceeding where
the court grants exclusive power to such lawyers to negotiate. This is so
because even though payment for common benefit work is assured in
successful mass torts, lawyers will still compete for the ability to justify
a relatively larger share of any common fees awarded by the court postsettlement. An example is Holocaust-era litigation against Swiss banks,
in connection with which multiple cases were consolidated under Rule
42 before Judge Edward R. Korman in the Southern District of New
York.349 The judge appointed an Executive Committee of plaintiffs’

347. See Erichson, supra note 45, at 961 (noting that the combination of CAFA and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 “reduce the likelihood of competing class actions in multiple courts”).
348. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
349. The district court established a website that provides a chronology of proceedings.
Chronology: In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, SWISS BANKS SETTLEMENT (Nov. 22, 2016),
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Chronology.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZSH3-A9Z7]; see also Morris
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counsel to oversee the litigation and settlement discussions.350 Those
lawyers competed with each other for position. When settlement talks
stalled because of the gap between the parties over settlement amount,
one subset of plaintiffs’ counsel unilaterally held a press conference to
announce a willingness to settle for amounts well below the $1.5 billion
figure other members of the Executive Committee had declared as a line
in the sand.351 The gambit failed in that one instance, where the $1.5
billion floor had widespread support among not only plaintiffs’ counsel
but also victim advocate groups and state and federal political figures
who were closely watching the proceedings.352 It likely also failed
because there was no alternative forum in which to effectuate a
settlement below that which the majority of court-appointed plaintiffs’
counsel was willing to accept.
Current mass tort institutional arrangements limit such behavior.
MDL trial courts frequently appoint only one or two lead counsel, whom
they select for their cooperative tendencies. Trial court judges or their
appointed neutrals are frequently at the center of settlement discussions,
which has the effect of anchoring discussions and making fragmentation
of plaintiffs’ counsel even less likely. Finally, as a matter of course,
MDL courts now frequently ask committees of counsel who played key
roles in the proceedings to render opinions for the court regarding the
extent to which other applicants for common benefit fees contributed
positively to the outcome;353 counsel who might otherwise be tempted to
win by losing know the likelihood of exposure is high.
As demonstrated in the following section, the very institutional
arrangements that have allowed federal courts to substantially control for
the worst of the conflicts problems of the pre-MDL-model, pre-CAFA
era make those same courts all-the-more resistant to Amchem’s conflicts
management formula.
A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the Executive and Judicial Branches, 20
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 212, 212 n.1 (2002).
350. Ratner, supra note 349, at 214.
351. See JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM’S FORTUNE: INSIDE THE EPIC BATTLE
OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST 93 (2002) (“On July 15, [Robert] Swift announced, with Ed
Fagan, that they were prepared to ‘come off the $1.5 billion figure’ named by Weiss, provided the
Swiss banks would increase their offer. Neither of them bothered to inform in advance the other
eight members of the committee running the lawsuit.”).
352. Ratner, supra note 349, at 214.
353. For example, in the BP litigation, Judge Barbier appointed a subset of the PSC to serve on a
fee committee to review fee applications in that litigation. See Pretrial Order No. 59 (Appointment
of Common Benefit Fee and Cost Committee and Guidelines for Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees
and Cost Reimbursement) [“Initial Fee Order”], In re Oil Spill, No. 12-970 (E.D. La. July 15,
2015), ECF No. 14863.
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Institutional Dissonance: Why Amchem’s Conflicts Management
Blueprint Is Unappealing to Lower Federal Courts

Even in the period immediately after Amchem was decided, some trial
court judges chafed at its dictates. Writing at the turn of the century,
Professor Resnik observed:
[C]lass actions still have their champions in state and federal
courts. Many trial judges, less buffered from needy litigants than
appellate judges, are acutely aware of injuries suffered by
groups of plaintiffs, of the lack of congressional responses to
date, of inequitable distribution patterns generated by case-bycase decision making, and of the inability of courts to render
enough of those case-by-case decisions. Such judges continue to
certify classes and help to craft settlements for some of them.354
Those impulses have magnified as lower courts have evolved new
techniques for managing large-scale litigation described in the preceding
section. Not only are the worst problems associated with late twentieth
century mass tort practice now largely muted, but the aims and
institutional structure of modern mass tort practice are inconsistent with
Amchem’s framework for managing conflicts.
1.

Judicial Confidence

Amchem’s agency cost framework relies on subclassing to harness
counsel’s fee-maximizing impulses in support of the interests of
properly defined subclasses. This incentive-based approach may seem
crude and limited, in that it accomplishes that interest alignment only as
to that limited category of conflicts that result in subclassing and
assumes that subclass counsel have sufficient leverage to advance
subclass member interests.355 But in the mass tort litigation landscape the
Supreme Court surveyed in the late 1990s, it was attractive. Judges
lacked sufficient control over proceedings due to jurisdictional
limitations, and it was commonly perceived that they lacked sufficient
knowledge of the claims and issues to effectively police for fairness
based on the settlement terms, especially when settlements were
presented.356 The MDL trial court judges who oversee mass tort practice
354. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2157
(2000) (citing, among other cases, In re Austrian & German Holocaust Bank Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d
164, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving a class settlement of Holocaust-era claims)).
355. See NAGAREDA, supra note 225, at 229 (teasing out the leverage problem).
356. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 16, at 1348 (“[C]ourts have little ability or incentive to resist
the settlements that the parties in class action litigation reach.”); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the
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today are differently situated. They typically are the center of gravity,
even if some cases still escape the MDL vortex; exercise tremendous
control over counsel and the proceedings, and are thus capable of
assuring proper case development via discovery and establishment of
bellwether trials; intervene and actively shape settlement discussions via
direct involvement or the appointment of neutrals; and, in short, can be
far more confident than could trial courts in earlier eras that the
outcomes they produce bear a reasonable relationship to merits.
That confidence is reflected in the language used by Judges Barbier
and Brody in their orders approving the BP and NFL settlements. Faced
with objections regarding conflicts and challenges to the merits of the
various settlements in both proceedings, the judges pointed to their own
involvement, the involvement of the neutrals they appointed to oversee
negotiations, and to the relationship between settlement payments and
claim value as proof that they were able to capably manage the
proceedings to a fair outcome.357 That may read to some as a familiar
expression of trial court hubris that predates the modern era. But these
judges now have the institutional arrangements in place to justify it.
Judicial self-confidence partly explains the shift from market- or
incentive-based conflicts management to a regulatory approach that
depends on involved judges to steer litigation to fair outcomes. It also
explains in part the resurgence of utilitarianism, where fair settlement
terms suggest adequate and sufficiently conflict-free representation.
2.

The Settlement Endgame

Confident federal trial court judges can still subclass. One major
reason they do not do so with the frequency or in the manner Amchem
and Ortiz imagined is captured in the Balkanization metaphor dissected
above, i.e., the fear that the competition among plaintiffs’ counsel
subclassing naturally generates will make it harder to achieve the goal of
the MDL model of litigating mass torts. A successful MDL judge is one
who resolves the litigation, and the only way to do that short of
knocking the cases out on a common issue, e.g., upon a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment on a question of law or fact that is
common to all coordinated actions, is via settlement.358 The desire for
Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 206 (2001) (judges’ lack of resources and expertise can make it challenging
for them to perform their role as fiduciaries for the class).
357. See supra notes 24849 and accompanying text.
358. See Burch, supra note 15, at 73 (noting that MDL judges use “innovative procedures to
usher these cases toward settlement”); id. at 76 (noting “institutional pressure” toward settlement of
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global resolution drives all facets of MDL management, because, per the
MDL statute359 and Lexecon,360 cases not resolved in pretrial
proceedings must, absent settlement, be sent back to their transferor
courts. That rarely happens.361 Instead, ninety-six percent of actions
consolidated in MDLs terminate before trial, and anecdotal evidence
suggests that the “large majority” of such resolutions are via
settlement.362
3.

Timing Is Everything

Settlement in the MDL model for processing mass tort claims occurs
in one of two primary modes: contract or class. An example of an
aggregate settlement achieved via contract is the Vioxx litigation,
resolved pursuant to an agreement between defendant Merck and
plaintiffs’ counsel.363 The BP and NFL case studies are examples of
class settlements, where only the representative plaintiffs and their
counsel sign an agreement that results in a binding judgment upon those
absent class members who do not opt out after receiving notice of its
terms. The mode to be adopted is normally not known at the outset,
when common benefit counsel are appointed as part of plaintiffs’
steering committees in the MDL. Instead, the settling parties in their
discretion elect the form of aggregation at the back end of proceedings
when they are negotiating settlement terms. Because no one seriously
expects certification of a litigation class in most mass torts,364 Rule 23
and its requirement of adequate representation need not be confronted
unless and until the parties make the choice to settle on a class basis.

MDLs); Silver & Miller, supra note 12, at 114 (noting that one of the purposes of the MDL statute
was to promote global settlements). But see Dodge, supra note 328, at 333 (“Modern MDL judges
no longer press settlement at all costs but instead embrace a wider variety of outcomes as successful
resolutions.”). See also Issacharoff, supra note 63, at 829 (overworked federal trial court judges
have an “overwhelming incentive to clear their docket. They cannot reliably police the day-to-day
interests of absent class members”).
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
360. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998) (MDL court
cannot transfer a case to itself for trial.).
361. See Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011) (“Remands are so uncommon, however, that
MDLs have been compared to ‘black holes.’” (citing, among others, Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials,
supra note 343, at 2330 n.21)).
362. DUKE STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 298, at xii.
363. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 15, at 274–81 (describing settlement).
364. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, nothing requires MDL courts to front-load those
considerations when appointing MDL common benefit counsel. So they
instead select along other dimensions, including cooperativeness. By the
time of any class action settlement, it is too late as a practical matter to
use subclassing to assure adequate representation via the alignment of
interests of subclass counsel and subgroups of class members because a
settlement has already been negotiated by conflicted counsel. As one set
of BP objectors noted: “[f]irst, there was Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee;
then there were settlement negotiations; and only then did the PSC select
class representatives to ratify a fait accompli.”365 That timeline naturally
places downward pressure on the Rule 23 standards regarding adequacy
of representation, and leads to an “anything but subclassing” mentality
among trial court judges looking to preserve global settlements. If judges
are confident they have helped to achieve a just class settlement that they
view as their only viable endgame, and if a strict reading of Amchem
disrupts that settlement, odds are that judges will read the strictness out
of the decision. And so they have.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to revisit Amchem and Ortiz. The Court is
unlikely to waver from the basic principle they espoused, that adequate
representation is the sine qua non of non-party preclusion. But late
twentieth century sensibilities regarding the nature of class conflicts that
might threaten adequate representation, regarding the role of conflicts
management in assuring adequate representation, and regarding
subclassing as the vehicle for achieving it, all now seem quaint and out
of touch with current institutional arrangements. It’s high time to
recognize the collapse of the class conflicts management regime
announced in Amchem and Ortiz and to acknowledge the contours of the
new regime emerging in its stead.

365. Memorandum in Support of Objections to the Economic and Property Damages Settlement
Agreement by Objectors Hunter Armour and Judith Armour at 10, In re Oil Spill, No. 02:10-cv07777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF No. 101.

